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ENERGY-ENVIRONMENT POLICY ALIGNMENTS 
Todd S. Aagaard
*
 
Abstract: Energy law focuses on making energy widely available at reasonable cost, and 
environmental law focuses on preventing pollution. As a result of these differences in their 
respective orientations, the two fields often work incoherently and even in conflict. 
Historically, federal energy law and environmental law have attempted to manage their 
interrelationships by imposing negative constraints on each other: Energy policies of the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) must comply with requirements set forth in 
environmental statutes, and the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA’s) statutes contain 
energy-related requirements and exemptions. More recently, however, FERC and EPA have 
begun developing policies that create beneficial alignments between their respective fields. 
This Article argues that these policy alignments, which emphasize opportunities for positive 
synergy rather than negative constraints, offer a promising new direction for the energy-
environment relationship. More broadly, policy alignments provide a potentially useful 
model for managing relationships among other overlapping fields as well. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Energy and the environment, which have long overlapped, are now 
converging to an unprecedented extent. Consider the following 
examples: 
 Energy production, energy markets, and energy use are driving 
many important and difficult environmental issues of our time. 
Energy-related activities account for 84.3% of anthropogenic 
greenhouse gas emissions in the United States.
1
 Burning coal for 
heat and power generation produces millions of tons per year of 
fly ash, bottom ash, and boiler slag, the disposal of which can 
contaminate land and water.
2
 
 Hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have rapidly 
transformed the United States’ energy economy. Domestic 
natural gas production from shale gas wells increased from 2.87 
trillion cubic feet in 2008 to 11.90 trillion cubic feet in 2013.
3
 In 
                                                     
1. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EPA 430-R-14-003, INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS 
EMISSIONS AND SINKS: 1990–2012, at 3-1 (2014) [hereinafter INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE 
GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS]. The data is for 2012. 
2. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, MANAGING COAL COMBUSTION RESIDUE IN MINES 23, 26 
(2006); Shaila Dewan, Hundreds of Coal Ash Dumps, with Virtually No Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 7, 2009, at A1; Michael Wines & Timothy Williams, Huge Leak of Coal Ash Slows at North 
Carolina Power Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2014, at A11. 
3. See U.S. Natural Gas Gross Withdrawals and Production, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., 
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2010, the United States was the world’s largest importer of 
natural gas;
4
 some analysts project that the United States will 
become a net exporter of natural gas as soon as 2016.
5
 This 
dramatic escalation of production has implications for pollution 
issues across all environmental media—air, water, and land—
and a range of natural resource issues as well.
6
 
 Legal and technical developments in the nation’s electricity grid 
have important ramifications for the development of alternative 
energy sources and technologies that may reduce the use of 
fossil fuels and their attendant environmental issues. 
Traditionally, vertically integrated utilities that generate power 
at large, centralized, fossil fuel-fired power plants have 
dominated the electric power industry.
7
 More recently, technical, 
legal, and economic innovations have enabled and supported the 
development of more decentralized power services.
8
 Much of 
this new wave of power services utilizes renewable energy and 
demand response resources
9
 that can substitute for fossil fuel 
combustion-based generation, with economic and environmental 
ramifications.
10
 
Contrary to the convergence of energy issues and environmental 
concerns, however, energy law and environmental law have stayed 
                                                     
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_sum_dcu_NUS_a.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).  
4. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, NATURAL GAS INFORMATION, at V.5 tbl.2 (2012). 
5. See Brian Scheid, LNG Growth to Make US Net Natural Gas Exporter by 2016, PLATTS 
MCGRAW HILL FIN. (Jan. 9, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.platts.com/latest-news/natural-
gas/washington/lng-growth-to-make-us-net-natural-gas-exporter-21054975. 
6. See Symposium, Environmental and Social Implications of Hydraulic Fracturing and Gas 
Drilling in the United States: An Integrative Workshop for the Evaluation of the State of Science 
and Policy, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 245, 250 (2012) (noting that environmental concerns 
associated with hydraulic fracturing and gas drilling include “water pollution, air pollution, 
landscape effects, habitat loss, and potential human health effects”). 
7. See Standardization of Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 34,190, 34,191 (June 13, 2005) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 2006] 
(stating that “the electric industry was once primarily the domain of vertically integrated utilities 
generating power at large centralized plants”); Edan Rotenberg, Energy Efficiency in Regulated and 
Deregulated Markets, 24 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 259, 275–76 (2006) (noting that “centralized 
fossil fuel burning power plants is . . . the dominant form of electricity generation”). 
8. See Order 2006, supra note 7, at 34,191. 
9. Demand response refers to reductions in electric energy consumption in response to an increase 
in price or to incentive payments. See 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(4) (2014). 
10. Cf. Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean A Death Spiral for 
Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (2014) (noting “a wave of innovation in energy markets that 
manifests as disruptive competition for electric utilities”). 
04 - Aagaard.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:07 PM 
1520 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:1517 
 
separate.
11
 Existing efforts to manage the energy-environment 
relationship, focused on merely preventing outright conflicts, have 
largely failed to reconcile the two fields.
12
 This Article argues in favor of 
an alternative model for bridging the energy-environment divide by 
creating policy alignments—policies that simultaneously support the 
objectives of energy law and environmental law. Policy alignments 
leverage opportunities for positive synergy and offer a promising new 
direction for the energy-environment relationship. 
Energy law and environmental law remain divided because of 
differences in their respective orientations. Energy law seeks to keep 
energy costs low. Like other energy agencies, the lead federal energy 
regulator, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), focuses 
on economic regulation to make energy widely available to end users at 
reasonable cost.
13
 For much of the twentieth century, energy policy 
promoted and benefited from economies of scale in the energy sector, in 
which increasing energy production leads to decreasing energy prices.
14
 
Low energy costs therefore depended on increasing energy use, and 
increasing energy use entailed increasing environmental impacts.
15
 
Moreover, policies aimed at making energy available and affordable also 
incentivized the use of coal, a fuel with historically low cost and ready 
availability but high pollutant emissions.
16
 Thus, energy law’s goal of 
                                                     
11. See Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment Disconnect, 46 
IDAHO L. REV. 473, 473, 494 (2010) (describing energy law’s and environmental law’s “opposing 
regulatory goals” as a manifestation of an “energy-environment disconnect”); Hari M. Osofsky, 
Complex Value Choices at the Environment-Energy Interface, 3 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 261, 
269 (2014) (referencing “the energy-environment divide”). At the state level, the divide is 
somewhat less clear and less stark, although it is present to a significant extent. See generally 
Michael Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties of Public Utility Commissions (2006), 
7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties] 
(cataloging the explicit and implicit authorities of state public utility commissions to incorporate 
environmental considerations in their decisions); Michael Dworkin et al., The Environmental Duties 
of Public Utility Commissions, 18 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 325 (2001) [hereinafter Dworkin et al., 
Environmental Duties] (same, five years earlier); Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the 
Convergence of Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180 (2013) 
(discussing state energy-related climate change policies that are creating energy-environment 
linkages). 
12. See infra Part II. 
13. See infra Part I.A. 
14. See JOSEPH P. TOMAIN & RICHARD D. CUDAHY, ENERGY LAW IN A NUTSHELL 378 (2d ed. 
2011); Joseph P. Tomain, The Dominant Model of United States Energy Policy, 61 U. COLO. L. 
REV. 355, 374–75 (1990).  
15. See, e.g., EFSTATHIOS E. (STATHIS) MICHAELIDES, ALTERNATIVE ENERGY SOURCES 33 
(2012) (noting environmental effects of increasing energy production and use). 
16. See, e.g., Alan S. Miller, Energy Policy from Nixon to Clinton: From Grand Provider to 
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low energy costs has had the effect of stimulating energy use and 
production and the environmental harms they cause. 
Environmental law has attempted to reduce environmental harms 
from energy-related activities such as power generation. The lead federal 
environmental regulator, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 
focuses on preventing pollution and damage to natural resources.
17
 
Reducing environmentally harmful emissions and discharges, however, 
generally costs money. The costs of installing pollution control 
equipment at a single coal-fired power plant, for example, may exceed 
$200 million.
18
 Thus, environmental regulations often increase the costs 
of energy production and use. 
This energy-environment divide does not entail a complete separation 
between the two fields. FERC’s energy statutes are subject to 
environmental requirements, and EPA’s environmental statutes contain 
energy requirements. But this limited cross-incorporation does little to 
transcend the divide. Instead, it adopts a negative model that attempts to 
manage energy-environment relationships by using requirements from 
one field to constrain the other: Environmental requirements constrain 
FERC,
19
 and energy requirements constrain EPA.
20
 Negative constraints 
thus, by their very design, place energy and environmental goals in 
opposition, exacerbating the energy-environment divide. Negative 
constraints also have limited efficacy because agencies have an incentive 
to avoid or minimize requirements that attempt to divert them from their 
core missions. Even when negative constraints are effective, they 
impede rather than empower agencies. 
Against this backdrop of an energy-environment divide, there is a 
promising alternative model for managing the energy-environment 
overlap. Within their respective jurisdictions, both FERC and EPA have 
                                                     
Market Facilitator, 25 ENVTL. L. 715, 717 (1995) (noting that federal energy policies under 
President Carter “sought to pressure utilities and industry to switch from oil and gas to more 
plentiful and domestically available coal”); see also Alice Kaswan, Climate Change, the Clean Air 
Act, and Industrial Pollution, 30 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 51, 65 (2012) (noting high pollutant 
emissions from coal combustion); David B. Spence, Coal-Fired Power in a Restructured Electricity 
Market, 15 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 187, 214 (2005) (referring to coal as a “historically cheap 
source of power”). 
17. See infra Part I.B. 
18. See George W. Sharp, Update: What’s That Scrubber Going to Cost?, 151 POWER MAG. 56, 
56 (2007) (reporting results of a survey of coal-fired power plants showing scrubber costs 
“consistently above $300/kW” for units with an average capacity of 956 MW); see generally 
Tomain, supra note 14, at 366 (stating that environmental and health and safety regulations “raised 
the cost of doing business” for the coal industry). 
19. See infra Part II.A. 
20. See infra Part II.B. 
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developed some policies that take advantage of circumstances in which 
energy goals and environmental goals align. These policy alignments 
involve policies in one field that align with, without directly adopting, 
the objectives of another field. Policy alignments thus allow each agency 
to pursue its respective mission and to utilize its specific expertise, but in 
ways that support the other’s policy objectives. Policy alignments create 
significant opportunities for progress in constructively managing the 
energy-environment divide. As the energy-environment overlap grows, 
increasing the interdependence of energy law and environmental law, 
energy and environmental regulators should identify and exploit 
opportunities for energy-environment policy alignments. 
This Article proceeds in three Parts. Part I explains how traditional 
energy law and environmental law reflect competing paradigms that 
create a divide between their respective approaches. Part II examines 
how federal energy law and environmental law have historically 
attempted to manage their overlap by imposing negative constraints on 
each other: FERC’s energy policies must comply with requirements set 
forth in environmental statutes, and EPA’s environmental statutes 
contain energy-related requirements and exemptions. Part III introduces 
examples of policies that create alignments between energy policies and 
environmental policies. These energy-environment policy alignments 
form the basis for an alternative model for managing energy-
environment relationships, a model oriented toward creating positive 
synergy rather than imposing negative constraints. The Article concludes 
by arguing that the policy alignment model offers a promising new 
direction for the energy-environment relationship, and potentially for 
other overlapping regulatory fields as well.
21
 
                                                     
21. Although the energy-environment divide exists under state regulatory regimes as well, this 
Article focuses on the divide as it is manifested in federal law. Focusing on the single federal 
system, rather than the diversity of state regimes, keeps the Article more manageable. For example, 
state environmental policies are a hybrid of programs that implement federal statutes under the 
cooperative federalism model and elements, sometimes contained within the same programs, 
created independently by the state. How this dynamic affects the ability of states to create energy-
environment policy alignments is an important question deserving of an entire article unto itself. 
That said, innovative policies that create energy-environment linkages at the federal level are likely 
to trickle down to state programs. In addition, federal law provides a worthwhile focus because the 
energy-environment divide is particularly stark under federal law. As other energy scholars have 
previously shown, some states have taken significant steps toward creating energy-environment 
linkages, often through legislation. See Dworkin et al., Revisiting the Environmental Duties, supra 
note 11; Dworkin et al., Environmental Duties, supra note 11; Klass, supra note 11. Thus, the 
administrative energy-environment policy alignments examined in this Article have a special 
efficacy in federal law that may well trickle down to state law, whereas state legislation creating 
energy-environment linkages is unlikely to induce similar federal innovation.  
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I. ENERGY LAW AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW’S 
COMPETING PARADIGMS 
A. Energy Law 
Federal policies regarding energy production, transmission, 
distribution, and use sprawl across many areas of law, many statutes, and 
many different federal agencies. A few examples include the following: 
 The Department of Energy establishes energy conservation 
standards for residential products and commercial and industrial 
equipment,
22
 pursuant to the Energy Policy and Conservation 
Act.
23
 
 The Secretary of the Interior leases federal lands for the 
extraction of minerals—including oil, gas, and coal—under the 
Mineral Leasing Act.
24
 
 The Nuclear Regulatory Commission issues licenses for nuclear 
power plants,
25
 pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act.
26
 
 The Mining Safety and Health Administration regulates coal 
mining to protect miner health and safety,
27
 pursuant to the 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977
28
 and the Mine 
Improvement and New Emergency Response (MINER) Act of 
2006.
29
 
Historically, however, the locus of federal regulatory authority over 
the energy sector has been FERC and, before that, its predecessor 
agency, the Federal Power Commission.
30
 FERC’s primary legal 
                                                     
22. 10 C.F.R. §§ 429.1–431.442 (2014). 
23. Energy Policy and Conservation Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975). Although the 
Energy Policy and Conservation Act initially delegated authority to the Federal Energy 
Administration, the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 
565, subsequently created the Department of Energy and transferred the Federal Energy 
Administration’s authority to the Department of Energy. Id. § 301(a), 91 Stat. at 577 (codified at 42 
U.S.C. § 7151(a)(C) (2012)). 
24. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181–287 (2012); see also Bruce M. Pendery, BLM’s Retained Rights: How 
Requiring Environmental Protection Fulfills Oil and Gas Lease Obligations, 40 ENVTL. L. 599, 602 
(2010) (noting that, as of 2008, thirty-nine million acres of federal land were subject to oil and gas 
leases). 
25. 10 C.F.R. §§ 52.0–52.303. 
26. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011–2297h-13. 
27. 30 C.F.R. §§ 70.1–90.301 (2014). 
28. 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–965. 
29. Pub. L. No. 109-236, 120 Stat. 493 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 801–965). 
30. The Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565, created 
FERC and transferred most of the Federal Power Commission’s authority to FERC. Id. § 401(a), 91 
Stat. at 582 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7171) (creating FERC); id. § 402(a), 91 Stat. at 583–84 
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authority derives from traditional energy statutes such as the Natural Gas 
Act
31
 and Federal Power Act.
32
 Congress enacted these statutes to 
protect consumers from monopolist natural gas companies and electric 
utilities that could use their market power to charge excessive rates.
33
 
In the early twentieth century, regulation of the energy sector was 
primarily a matter of state law. State statutes established public utility 
commissions—sometimes also called public service commissions or 
corporation commissions—to regulate sales of natural gas and electricity 
by public utilities.
34
 These state statutes, which generally require public 
utilities to sell energy on terms that are “just and reasonable,” often 
substantially predated federal energy statutes.
35
 In the 1920s, however, 
the Supreme Court held that the Dormant Commerce Clause precludes 
states from regulating interstate energy activities.
36
 These Supreme 
Court decisions created gaps in state regulatory authority over interstate 
energy activities. 
Congress enacted the federal energy statutes in the 1930s to plug the 
                                                     
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)) (transferring various Federal Power Commission authorities to 
FERC). 
31. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717z (2012). 
32. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–828c (2012). 
33. See NAACP v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 425 U.S. 662, 669–70 (1976) (“In the case of the Power 
and Gas Acts it is clear that the principal purpose of those Acts was to encourage the orderly 
development of plentiful supplies of electricity and natural gas at reasonable prices.”); Fed. Power 
Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 610 (1944) (“The primary aim of this legislation 
[the Natural Gas Act] was to protect consumers against exploitation at the hands of natural gas 
companies.”); Mun. Light Bds. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 450 F.2d 1341, 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (“Its 
[the Federal Power Act’s] primary aim is the protection of consumers from excessive rates and 
charges.”); United Distrib. Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105, 1122 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“Federal regulation 
of the natural gas industry is thus designed to curb pipelines’ potential monopoly power over gas 
transportation. The enormous economies of scale involved in the construction of natural gas 
pipelines tend to make the transportation of gas a natural monopoly.” (footnotes omitted)). 
34. See, e.g., Shawnee Gas & Elec. Co. v. State, 122 P. 222 (Okla. 1912) (holding that court was 
without jurisdiction to review an order of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission prescribing a 
schedule of rates to be charged by a gas utility company).  
35. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 65 (McKinney, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Session) 
(requiring “just and reasonable” service and rates for gas and electricity service). The New York 
legislature originally enacted this provision in 1910. See Act of Jan. 5, 1910, ch. 480, § 65, 1910 
N.Y. Laws 1, 59. 
36. In Missouri v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 307–08 (1924), the Supreme Court 
held that the interstate transportation of natural gas for sale to distributing companies is interstate 
commerce protected from state regulation by the Dormant Commerce Clause. See also Pub. Utils. 
Comm’n v. Landon, 249 U.S. 236, 245 (1919). In Public Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & 
Electric Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927), the Court applied the rationale of Kansas Natural Gas to hold that 
the Dormant Commerce Clause precludes states from regulating interstate sales of electricity. Id. at 
89–90. 
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gaps in state regulatory authority.
37
 The federal statutes maintain a 
delicate and difficult balance between state and federal regulatory 
authority. This balance reflects the fact that regulation of public utilities 
has long been a core function of state government but the energy sector 
involves many interstate activities that require a federal role.
38
 
The Federal Power Act originated as the Federal Water Power Act of 
1920,
39
 which created the Federal Power Commission (FPC) as an 
independent regulatory commission and authorized it to issue licenses 
for facilities and equipment used to produce hydropower on waterbodies 
subject to federal jurisdiction over foreign and interstate commerce.
40
 In 
addition to giving the FPC authority to license hydropower facilities, the 
1920 Act also authorized the Commission to regulate electricity sold 
from such hydropower into interstate or foreign commerce to ensure that 
“rates charged and the service rendered” for such power are “reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory, and just to the consumer.”41 The 1920 Act thus 
essentially adopted the “just and reasonable” standard from state public 
utility statutes and applied it to a matter under federal jurisdiction. 
In 1935, Congress, acting to plug the gaps in regulatory authority 
created by Supreme Court decisions limiting state authority over 
interstate electricity transactions,
42
 amended the Federal Water Power 
Act to create the Federal Power Act.
43
 The 1935 legislation added a new 
subchapter giving the FPC authority to regulate electric utility 
companies engaged in interstate commerce.
44
 Specifically, the Federal 
Power Act granted the FPC jurisdiction to regulate “the transmission of 
electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at 
wholesale in interstate commerce.”45 The Act generally excludes 
generation facilities, local distribution facilities, facilities used only for 
intrastate transmission of electric power, and facilities for transmission 
of power used wholly by the transmitter.
46
 
                                                     
37. See Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 378–79 (1983) 
(explaining that Congress enacted the Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act to fill the regulatory 
gaps created by Kansas Natural Gas and Attleboro).  
38. See id. at 377. 
39. Federal Water Power Act of 1920, ch. 285, 41 Stat. 1063 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 792–823d 
(2012)). 
40. Federal Water Power Act §§ 1, 4(e), 16 U.S.C. §§ 792, 797(e). 
41. Id. § 20, 16 U.S.C. § 813. 
42. See supra notes 37–38 and accompanying text. 
43. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 803 (1935).  
44. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824–824w. 
45. Federal Power Act § 201(a), 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). 
46. Id. § 201(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1). These exclusions are not complete. For example, the 
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In 1977, the Department of Energy Organization Act
47
 created FERC 
and gave it authority over, among other things, administration and 
enforcement of the Federal Power Act.
48
 FERC’s primary regulatory role 
under the Federal Power Act is to ensure that wholesale electricity rates 
are just, reasonable, and not unduly preferential.
49
 The Federal Power 
Act also gives FERC other responsibilities, such as directing public 
utilities to interconnect with someone engaged in the transmission or 
sale of electricity.
50
 
In addition to FERC’s authority over electric power transmission and 
wholesale sales under the Federal Power Act, other federal energy 
statutes give FERC jurisdiction over interstate natural gas and oil 
transactions. Because later parts of this Article focus on the Federal 
Power Act,
51
 these other energy statutes will receive only brief mention 
here. The Natural Gas Act, enacted in 1938,
52
 allows FERC to regulate 
interstate transportation of natural gas, sale in interstate commerce of 
natural gas for resale, and import or export of natural gas in foreign 
commerce.
53
 FERC also regulates interstate oil pipelines, pursuant to the 
                                                     
Federal Power Act gives FERC authority to regulate wholesale rates of electric generating facilities 
in interstate commerce. See Miss. Indus. v. FERC, 808 F.2d 1525, 1543–45 (D.C. Cir. 1987), aff’d, 
Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi, 487 U.S. 354 (1988). 
47. Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 Stat. 565 (1977). 
48. Id. § 401(a), 91 Stat. at 582 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7151 (2012)) (creating FERC); id. 
§ 402(a)(1)(A), (B), (F), (2)(A), 91 Stat. at 583–84 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(A), (B), (F), 
(2)(A)) (transferring the FPC’s authority under the Federal Power Act to FERC). 
49. Federal Power Act § 205(a)–(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a)–(b). 
50. Id. § 202(b), 16 U.S.C. § 824a(b). 
51. See infra Part A. 
52. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938). 
53. Natural Gas Act § 1(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2012). The Act exempts so-called Hinshaw 
pipelines—local distribution pipelines within a state that, although they receive gas from interstate 
pipelines that originate in other states, convey gas for consumption only within the same state. Id. 
§ 1(c), 15 U.S.C. § 717(c); Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal. v. FERC, 143 F.3d 610, 614 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). As with the Federal Power Act, Congress originally charged FPC with administering the 
Natural Gas Act, see ch. 556, § 2(9), 52 Stat. at 822, but transferred that responsibility to FERC in 
1977. Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-91, § 402(a)(1)(C)–(F), 
(2)(B), 91 Stat. 565, 583–84 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172(a)(1)(C)–(F), (2)(B)). For natural gas-
related activities within its jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act, FERC issues certificates of public 
convenience and necessity authorizing companies to transport or sell natural gas, Natural Gas Act 
§ 7(c)–(h), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)–(h); see also TOMAIN & CUDAHY, supra note 14, at 288 (describing 
the certificate of public convenience and necessity as “a license requirement subjecting a company 
to federal jurisdiction and allowing the company to operate in interstate commerce”), approves 
facilities, see Natural Gas Act § 3(e), 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e) (authorizing FERC to approve or deny 
applications for FERC liquid natural gas terminals); id. § 7(a)–(b), 15 U.S.C. § 717f(a)–(b) 
(authorizing FERC to approve the extension, improvement, or abandonment of natural gas facilities 
within its jurisdiction), and regulates terms of sale and transport to ensure that they are just, 
reasonable, and not unduly preferential, see id. § 3(e), 15 U.S.C. § 717c(f). 
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Interstate Commerce Act.
54
 
B. Environmental Law 
EPA is charged with administering, in whole or in part, at least 
twenty-three separate statutes.
55
 A few of these statutes, however, form 
the core of the agency’s regulatory responsibilities and comprise much 
of the canon of federal environmental law.
56
 This environmental law 
canon has a history very different from that of the traditional energy 
statutes. 
Congress enacted the federal energy statutes primarily during the 
1930s, and they largely reflected an extension of state public utilities 
statutes that had existed for decades.
57
 By contrast, the federal 
environmental statutes Congress enacted in the 1970s represented a 
dramatic change in environmental regulation that has been called the 
                                                     
54. Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 49 U.S.C.). The original Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 created the Interstate 
Commerce Commission to regulate interstate and international railroads. Id. § 1, 24 Stat. at 379. 
The Act required all charges for such railroad services to be “reasonable and just,” id., and required 
railroads to act as common carriers, prohibited from giving undue preferences and required to post 
fares and schedules. Id. §§ 3, 6, 24 Stat. at 380. The Act created the Interstate Commerce 
Commission to administer and enforce the statute. Id. §§ 11, 12, 24 Stat. at 383. 
In 1906, Congress enacted the Hepburn Act, Pub. L. No. 59-337, 34 Stat. 584 (1906) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.), which amended the Interstate Commerce Act and 
extended it—and the Commission’s jurisdiction—to interstate and international oil pipelines. Id. 
§ 1, 34 Stat. at 584. In 1977, the Department of Energy Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 95-91, 91 
Stat. 565 (1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 3 U.S.C., 5 U.S.C., 7 U.S.C., 12 
U.S.C., 15 U.S.C., & 42 U.S.C.), created FERC and gave it authority over oil pipelines under the 
Interstate Commerce Act. Id. § 401(a), 91 Stat. at 582 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7171) (creating 
FERC); id. § 402(b), 91 Stat. at 584 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7172) (transferring the Interstate 
Commerce Commission’s authority over oil pipelines to FERC). In 1978, Congress repealed the 
Interstate Commerce Act but retained FERC’s existing authority over oil pipelines. Act of Oct. 17, 
1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473, § 4(c), 92 Stat. 1337, 1470. This effectively subjects oil pipelines to the 
version of the Interstate Commerce Act in effect in 1977. See Frontier Pipeline Co. v. FERC, 452 
F.3d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Exxon Pipeline Co. v. United States, 725 F.2d 1467, 1468 n.1 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984). 
55. See Laws and Executive Orders, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, 
http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/laws-and-executive-orders?_ga=1.264553807.1962208094. 
1383849018 (last visited Oct. 3, 2015).  
56. See Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND. L.J. 1239, 1251 (2014). 
Other statutes that comprise the canon include the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 
U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h, and Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2012), both 
of which give EPA some authority but apply more generally throughout the federal government. See 
Aagaard, supra, at 1257–59 (classifying NEPA and the ESA as “special cases” within the 
environmental law canon). 
57. See supra Part I.A. 
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Environmental Law Revolution.
58
 These landmarks were enacted in a 
surge of legislative activity that “appeared to come virtually out of 
nowhere,” but in fact the seeds of which had been germinating for 
years.
59
 Longstanding natural resource statutes, such as the National 
Park Service Organic Act,
60
 embodied a continuing—and growing—
concern with conserving natural resources.
61
 During the post-World War 
II years, some segments of the public and influential leaders began 
focusing on policies to protect public health.
62
 Environmental pollution 
gained salience, driven by disasters such as air pollution that killed 
scores of residents of Donora, Pennsylvania, in 1948, and by books such 
as Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring.63 “By the end of the 1960s, a diverse 
range of constituencies representing previously separate aspects of 
environmental protection . . . coalesced into a broad movement 
demanding changes in both the substance and the process of 
environmental policy.”64 With respect to the two most prominent 
environmental issues—air pollution and water pollution—Congress 
acted incrementally. As early measures that focused on supporting state 
regulatory efforts failed to generate results, Congress adopted a series of 
measures that asserted an increasingly strong and direct federal role.
65
 
The Clean Air Act
66
 is the primary federal air pollution statute. 
Congress enacted the Act in 1970 “to protect and enhance the quality of 
the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the public health and welfare 
and the productive capacity of its population.”67 As one of the early 
elements of the set of landmark environmental legislation Congress 
adopted in the 1970s, the Clean Air Act created a strong federal role in 
air pollution regulation, following decades of repeated unsuccessful 
                                                     
58. See, e.g., Holly Doremus, Preserving Citizen Participation in the Era of Reinvention: The 
Endangered Species Act Example, 25 ECOLOGY L.Q. 707, 717 (1999); Robert L. Fischman, What Is 
Natural Resources Law?, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 717, 720 (2007); J.B. Ruhl, The Fitness of Law: 
Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning 
for Democracy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1407, 1459–60 (1996). 
59. See RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 49 (2004). 
60. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 18f-3. 
61. See LAZARUS, supra note 59, at 49–50. 
62. See id. at 50–51. 
63. See id. at 52, 58–60; cf. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962) (describing adverse 
environmental impacts of pesticide use). 
64. RICHARD N.L. ANDREWS, MANAGING THE ENVIRONMENT, MANAGING OURSELVES: A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 202–03 (2d ed. 2006). 
65. See id. at 203–10; LAZARUS, supra note 59, at 52–54. 
66. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
67. Clean Air Act § 101(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b)(1). 
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attempts to nudge states into taking action against air pollution.
68
 The 
Act authorizes EPA to regulate air pollutant emissions from both 
stationary sources,
69
 such as factories and power plants, and mobile 
sources,
70
 such as cars, trucks, and locomotives. 
The Clean Water Act
71
 is the primary federal water pollution statute, 
water pollution’s counterpart to the Clean Air Act. Congress enacted the 
Clean Water Act in 1972 “to restore and maintain the chemical, 
physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”72 The Clean 
Water Act regulates discharges of pollutants into waters of the United 
States.
73
 The Act directs EPA to establish effluent limitations on how 
much pollution can be discharged into waters of the United States.
74
 
The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)
75
 regulates 
the handling of hazardous waste. Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 to 
“minimiz[e] the dangers of hazardous waste disposal.”76 RCRA’s 
hallmark “cradle to grave” approach comprehensively regulates 
hazardous waste from the time that it is generated until it is safely 
disposed of.
77
 RCRA directs EPA to promulgate standards governing 
hazardous waste generators,
78
 transporters,
79
 and owners and operators 
of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.
80
 
The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (CERCLA),
81
 also known as the Superfund statute, 
authorizes the cleanup of environmental contamination and imposes 
liability for such cleanups.
82
 Congress was moved to enact CERCLA in 
                                                     
68. See generally Train v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 421 U.S. 60, 63–64 (1975). 
69. See, e.g., Clean Air Act §§ 111, 112, 165, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411, 7412, 7475. 
70. Id. §§ 202–250, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521–7590. 
71. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
72. Id. § 1251(a). 
73. Id. § 1311(a) (prohibiting “the discharge of any pollutant by any person”); id. § 1362(12) 
(defining “discharge of a pollutant” to mean “any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from 
any point source”); id. § 1362(7) (defining “navigable waters” to mean “waters of the United 
States”). 
74. Id. § 1311. In addition to giving EPA authority to regulate wastewater discharges, the Act 
authorizes the Army Corps of Engineers to regulate the discharge of dredge or fill material into 
waters of the United States. Id. § 1344. 
75. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k. 
76. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1491, at 11 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6249. 
77. See Envtl. Def. Fund v. Gorsuch, 713 F.2d 802, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
78. Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) § 3002, 42 U.S.C. § 6922. 
79. Id. § 3003, 42 U.S.C. § 6923. 
80. Id. § 3004, 42 U.S.C. § 6924. 
81. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675. 
82. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) 
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1980 in response to environmental contamination at the infamous Love 
Canal and other sites.
83
 CERCLA and RCRA thus play complementary 
roles: RCRA regulates hazardous waste handling to prevent 
environmental contamination, and CERCLA authorizes the cleanup of 
contamination where it nevertheless has occurred.
84
 
C. Creating the Energy-Environment Divide 
As the preceding examples illustrate, energy statutes and 
environmental statutes regulate quite differently. They regulate different 
things: Energy statutes primarily regulate the economic terms of energy-
related transactions, whereas environmental statutes primarily regulate 
pollutant emissions and discharges into the environment. Energy statutes 
and environmental statutes also regulate for different purposes: Energy 
statutes regulate primarily to protect consumers’ access to affordable 
energy, whereas environmental statutes regulate primarily to protect 
public health and the environment. 
1. Economic Regulation and Social Regulation 
To a significant extent, the differences between energy statutes and 
environmental statutes reflect the distinction between economic 
regulation and social regulation. Economic regulation and social 
regulation can be defined by their differing objectives. Economic 
regulation “intervene[s] directly in market decisions such as pricing, 
competition, market entry, or exit” to improve the functioning of 
markets.
85
 Social regulation, by contrast, “protect[s] public interests such 
as health, safety, the environment, and social cohesion.”86 Economic 
                                                     
gives EPA “broad power . . . to clean up hazardous waste sites,” Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 
511 U.S. 809, 814 (1994), and imposes strict liability on anyone who contributes—from generation 
through disposal—to contamination caused by a “release, or threatened release,” of a “hazardous 
substance,” see CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 
1192, 1198 (2d Cir. 1992). 
83. See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 120 n.5 (2d 
Cir. 2010). 
84. See B.F. Goodrich Co., 958 F.2d at 1202 (“RCRA is preventative; CERCLA is curative.”). 
85. See OECD, THE OECD REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM: SYNTHESIS 6 (1997).  
86. Id.; see also Thomas O. McGarity, Regulatory Reform in the Reagan Era, 45 MD. L. REV. 
253, 254–55 (1986) (“Economic regulation is concerned with preventing undue economic 
concentration, regulating natural monopolies, eliminating economic windfalls, ensuring adequate 
distribution of goods and services, and reducing fraud in economic transactions . . . . Social 
regulation, by contrast, is concerned with reducing health and environmental risks, preserving civil 
rights and equal opportunity, and generally controlling the extent to which one group of persons 
enjoys the benefits of a technology or enterprise without sharing in its costs.”). 
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regulation primarily aims at addressing market failures that arise through 
monopoly and market power; social regulation primarily aims at 
problems of externalities.
87
 
Economic regulation and social regulation differ in regulatory 
approach as well. Economic regulation tends to regulate on a sector or 
industry-specific basis, whereas social regulation applies broadly across 
the economy.
88
 Economic regulation adopts direct market oversight 
through measures such as price controls and entry/exit controls, whereas 
social regulation employs regulatory or allocative controls such as a 
prohibition against certain types of discrimination.
89
 
The traditional energy statutes—the Federal Power Act, Natural Gas 
Act, and Interstate Commerce Act—typify economic regulation. 
Congress enacted these energy statutes to protect consumers from 
monopolist natural gas companies and electric utilities that could use 
their market power to charge excessive rates.
90
 Each statute appoints an 
agency—formerly the Federal Power Commission and Interstate 
Commerce Commission, now FERC—to oversee a particular industry 
(wholesale electric power, interstate natural gas, or interstate oil 
pipeline) to ensure that consumers receive reliable energy service at 
reasonable rates.
91
 
Environmental statutes such as the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, 
RCRA, and CERCLA exemplify social regulation. They take aim at 
pollution and other environmental impacts, which are examples of 
classic externalities. Instead of regulating particular industries 
comprehensively, environmental statutes tend to address a particular 
problem, such as water pollution, across all industries. Instead of direct 
market oversight, environmental statutes regulate conduct that generates 
externalities, such as burning coal that emits air pollution. 
2. Energy-Environment Interrelationships 
Although energy and environmental statutes embody different 
                                                     
87. See Peter H. Schuck, The Politics of Regulation, 90 YALE L.J. 702, 711–12 (1981) (reviewing 
JAMES Q. WILSON, THE POLITICS OF REGULATION (1980)). In addition to monopoly power, 
economic regulation sometimes aims at excessive competition and economic rents. See Joseph P. 
Tomain & Sidney A. Shapiro, Analyzing Government Regulation, 49 ADMIN. L. REV. 377, 403–07 
(1997). In addition to externalities, social regulation sometimes aims at the problems of inadequate 
information, scarcity, and public goods. Id. at 407–11. 
88. See Schuck, supra note 87, at 709. 
89. See Tomain & Shapiro, supra note 87, at 403, 407. 
90. See supra note 33. 
91. See supra notes 48, 53, 54 and accompanying text. 
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regulatory orientations—energy law toward economic regulation, and 
environmental law toward social regulation—they overlap substantially 
in their application due to the environmental effects of energy 
production, transportation, and use. Laws have intertwined energy use 
and environmental concerns since at least the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, when English monarchs attempted to prohibit the burning of 
coal in London due to poor air quality.
92
 
Environmental considerations affect markets. Indeed, that effect, 
rooted in the understanding that environmental impacts involve 
externalities not reflected in the unregulated market, is the basis for 
regulatory intervention to protect the environment. That the natural gas 
pipeline has no economic incentive to take into account its effects on 
wildlife, for example, justifies laws requiring FERC to weigh those 
environmental effects in deciding whether to authorize the pipeline. 
Environmental regulation can increase the cost of production for a fuel 
source, affecting both the market price and quantity of the fuel 
consumed. Whether this distorts or corrects the market depends on the 
regulation. 
Markets, moreover, affect the environment. Electricity and natural gas 
rates influence how much electric power and natural gas consumers use. 
Energy use determines how many natural gas wells are drilled and how 
much electric power is generated, and consequently how much pollution 
is emitted with those activities. The relative economic costs of different 
types of energy also affect what energy sources are used. The balance 
between coal and natural gas use, for example, which strongly affects air 
pollutant emissions, depends in significant part on the relative cost of the 
two fuel types. Low natural gas prices in recent years have substantially 
reduced air emissions by inducing power companies to use more natural 
gas and less coal to generate electricity.
93
 But low natural gas prices 
could also suppress the development of even cleaner energy sources, 
such as nuclear and wind.
94
 
3. Energy-Environment Conflicts 
The energy-environment divide harms both energy law and 
                                                     
92. See Peter Brimblecombe & László Makra, Selections from the History of Environmental 
Pollution, with Special Attention to Air Pollution. Part 2*: From Medieval Times to the 19th 
Century, 23 INT’L J. ENV’T & POLLUTION 351, 355 (2005). 
93. Today in Energy: Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions Declined in 2012, U.S. ENERGY 
INFO. ADMIN. (Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=10691#.  
94. See Matthew L. Wald, The Potential Downside of Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2014, at 
B3.  
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environmental law. The mere existence of a divide would not necessarily 
be problematic. Due to the different orientations of the fields, it seems 
rational to separate them and for agencies to specialize. The problem is 
that their differing orientations cause conflicts that impede the 
effectiveness of each. As noted, energy statutes focus on economic 
regulation to make energy widely available to end users at reasonable 
cost,
95
 whereas environmental statutes focus on preventing pollution and 
damage to natural resources.
96
 The goals lead the two fields to work at 
cross-purposes, with energy law seeking to keep energy costs low, 
stimulating energy use and the harms it causes, while environmental law 
has attempted to reduce environmental harms, and in doing so increases 
energy costs by regulating emissions from energy production and use.
97
 
The energy-environment divide is not only harmful, it is also 
unnecessary. Although the reasons for conflicts between energy law and 
environmental law are clear in light of their differing perspectives, the 
conflicts are not inherent or inevitable. The monopoly power targeted by 
energy statutes and the externalities targeted by environmental statutes 
are both forms of market failure because they prevent markets from 
allocating resources efficiently.
98
 A rational regulatory approach 
therefore would pursue an efficient market that would be both 
competitive and would internalize externalities.
99
 To the extent that the 
two fields conflict, it is because they each pursue their respective goals 
blind to the goals of the other. 
II. NEGATIVE CONSTRAINTS EXACERBATE THE ENERGY-
ENVIRONMENT DIVIDE 
Part I explained that the differing orientations of energy law and 
environmental law have created conflicts between the two fields. These 
conflicts arise in part because each field has its own objectives and does 
not necessarily consider other objectives. Part II examines the primary 
                                                     
95. See Davies, supra note 11, at 483 (“The dominant energy policy paradigm in the United 
States is ample energy supplies at the cheapest price. Energy law indelibly reflects this.”). 
96. See LAZARUS, supra note 59, at 1 (“[E]nvironmental law regulates human activity in order to 
limit ecological impacts that threaten public health and biodiversity.”). 
97. See Davies, supra note 11, at 495. 
98. See U.S. COMPTROLLER GEN., NO. PAD-77-34, GOVERNMENT REGULATORY ACTIVITY: 
JUSTIFICATIONS, PROCESSES, IMPACTS, AND ALTERNATIVES  6 (1977). 
99. Cf. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Environmental Regulation, Energy, and Market Entry, 15 DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 167, 167–68 (2005) (noting that a single normative criterion, allocative 
efficiency, defines a well-functioning market and that there is no inherent conflict “between pursuit 
of energy policy goals and environmental regulations”). 
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mechanism by which energy law and environmental law have attempted 
to manage their divide. To address conflicts, energy and environmental 
laws have traditionally adopted requirements that attempt to force 
agencies to consider the conflicts their policies create. Part II.A explains 
how environmental statutes impose requirements that apply to FERC’s 
energy programs. Part II.B then explains how EPA’s environmental 
statutes include energy requirements. Part II.C concludes that, although 
environmental requirements and energy requirements are intended to 
reconcile energy law and environmental law’s divide, they in fact 
exacerbate it. 
A. Environmental Requirements in Energy Law 
Many of the energy-related activities that FERC licenses, permits, and 
regulates under its energy statutes have direct environmental effects. 
Hydropower facilities disrupt rivers and streams that provide habitat for 
fish and wildlife.
100
 Activities associated with building and operating oil 
and gas pipelines and electricity transmission facilities may emit air 
pollutants, discharge water pollutants, fill wetlands, affect coastal zones, 
or fragment habitat.
101
 These environmental effects trigger the 
application of federal environmental statutes, including the Clean Air 
Act;
102
 Clean Water Act;
103
 Coastal Zone Management Act,
104
 National 
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
105
 and Endangered Species Act 
(ESA).
106
 FERC decisions often address the application of these 
environmental statutes.
107
 
                                                     
100. See, e.g., Nw. Res. Info. Ctr. v. Nw. Power Planning Council, 35 F.3d 1371, 1375–76 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (noting that the Columbia River Basin’s hydropower system has contributed to the 
decline of salmon and steelhead populations). 
101. See Islander E. Pipeline Co. v. McCarthy, 525 F.3d 141, 151–52 (2d Cir. 2008) (examining 
impacts of pipeline construction on shellfish habitat); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 98 FERC ¶ 
61,027, 61,076 (2002) (noting air emissions from pipeline compressor stations). 
102. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671q (2012). 
103. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387 (2012). 
104. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451–1466 (2012). 
105. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321–4370h. 
106. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544. See Federal Statutes: Environmental, FED. ENERGY REG. 
COMMISSION, http://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta.asp (last updated Apr. 14, 2015) (listing the Federal 
Deepwater Ports Act of 1974, Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, Coastal Zone Management Act, 
ESA, Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act, National Environmental Policy Act, National Historic 
Preservation Act, Rivers and Harbors Act, and Wild and Scenic Rivers Act). 
107. See, e.g., Dominion Transmission, Inc., 141 FERC ¶ 61,240 (2012) (addressing application 
of the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, and ESA to construction and operation of natural gas 
compression, pipeline, and storage facilities); City of Tacoma, Washington, 104 FERC ¶ 61,324 
(2003) (addressing application of the Clean Water Act, ESA, and CZMA to relicensing of a 
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Clean Air Act section 176 prohibits federal agencies from supporting, 
licensing, or permitting any activity that does not conform to an 
applicable state implementation plan developed to attain air quality at 
levels below the National Ambient Air Quality Standards.
108
 Thus, when 
FERC licenses or permits an activity that will result in new air pollutant 
emissions, such as the construction and operation of a natural gas 
pipeline that will include compressor stations, the agency must 
determine whether emissions resulting from the activity will cause air 
pollution problems in the areas in which the emissions occur.
109
 
Other environmental statutes also contain environmental 
requirements: 
 Under Clean Water Act section 401, an applicant for a federal 
license or permit to conduct any activity that may result in a 
discharge into navigable waters must provide the licensing or 
permitting agency with a certification from the relevant state 
that the discharge will comply with applicable water quality 
standards.
110
 Thus, FERC cannot issue a hydropower license 
under the Federal Power Act unless it receives a water quality 
certification (or waiver) from the state.
111
 State water quality 
                                                     
hydroelectric project); Millennium Pipeline Co., 100 FERC ¶ 61,277 (2002) (addressing application 
of the Clean Water Act, ESA, and CZMA to construction and operation of a natural gas pipeline). 
108. 42 U.S.C. § 7506. The Clean Air Act section 109 directs EPA to establish National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS) at levels sufficient to protect the public health and welfare. Id. 
§ 7409. Each state must develop state implementation plans that allow air quality control regions 
within the state to attain the NAAQS. Id. § 7410. 
EPA regulations implementing Clean Air Act section 176 require a federal agency to assess, as a 
threshold matter, whether its actions will result in “direct and indirect emissions” that exceed certain 
specified thresholds. 40 C.F.R. § 93.153(b)–(c) (2014). If the emissions exceed the threshold, the 
agency must prepare a conformity determination confirming that emissions from the action comply 
with all relevant requirements in applicable state implementation plans. Id. § 93.158(c). 
109. See, e.g., Dominion Transmission, Inc., 142 FERC ¶ 61,179 (2013). FERC decisions 
addressing compliance with Clean Air Act section 176 have addressed, for example, whether a 
licensed facility will have indirect effects that may violate the terms of a state implementation plan, 
such as a natural gas pipeline that may lead to emissions from burning the gas transported through 
the pipeline. See S. Coast Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. FERC, 621 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding 
that FERC was not required to account for such emissions because they were not subject to FERC’s 
control and because the amount of gas the pipeline would carry was uncertain); Sabine Pass 
Liquefaction, LLC, 139 FERC ¶ 61,039 (2012) (same). 
110. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1), (d) (2012). The requirement is waived if the state does not act on a 
request for certification within a reasonable period of time, which shall not exceed one year. See id. 
111. See PUD No. 1 of Jefferson Cnty. v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 (1994) (holding 
that states may condition project certification on any limitations, including minimum flow 
requirements, necessary to comply with state water quality standards or other appropriate 
requirements of state law); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 143 FERC ¶ 62,102 (2013) (noting 
waiver of requirement where state declined to issue certification); Creamer & Noble Energy, Inc., 
92 FERC ¶ 62,076 (2000) (dismissing application for hydropower project license where applicant 
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certifications often include limitations and requirements on the 
project, which by operation of Clean Water Act section 401 
become a condition on FERC’s license.112 
 Following a structure similar to the water quality certification 
under Clean Water Act section 401, the Coastal Zone 
Management Act (CZMA) requires an applicant for a federal 
license or permit authorizing any activity that affects land, water 
use, or natural resource of a coastal zone to certify that the 
activity is consistent with the applicable state CZMA 
management program.
113
 Thus, when an applicant seeks a FERC 
license for an activity within a designated coastal zone, such as a 
hydropower project
114
 or pipeline,
115
 the CZMA requires the 
applicant to obtain a certification of consistency with the 
applicable state CZMA management plan. 
 Pursuant to the ESA, FERC must consult with the Fish and 
Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service when the 
agency receives an application to license a project that may 
affect an endangered species.
116
 
                                                     
had failed to procure a state water quality certification). 
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d); see Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 132 FERC ¶ 62,101 (2010) (accepting a state 
temporary water quality certification amendment and incorporating it as a temporary amendment to 
the project license). In addition to section 401, FERC-approved projects sometimes implicate Clean 
Water Act section 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a), which requires a permit from the Army Corps of 
Engineers to discharge dredge or fill material into waters of the United States. See, e.g., 
Cogeneration, Inc., 76 FERC ¶ 61,193 (1996) (noting that construction of hydropower project 
required a § 404 permit); Idaho Power Co., 64 FERC ¶ 62,057 (1993) (noting that relocation of 
boating launch area connected to hydropower project required a § 404 permit). 
113. 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(3)(A) (2012). The state then has six months to notify the federal agency 
whether it concurs with or objects to the applicant’s certification of consistency; if the state does not 
respond within six months, its concurrence is presumed. Id. 
114. See Mountain Rhythm Res. v. FERC, 302 F.3d 958, 960 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming FERC’s 
dismissal of applications for hydropower license under Federal Power Act where applicant failed to 
apply for county Shoreline Management Act permit). 
115. See Nw. Pipeline, GP, 145 FERC ¶ 61,013 (2013) (reaffirming FERC’s conditional approval 
of certificate of public convenience and necessity, subject to subsequent CZMA consistency 
certification from state).  
116. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (requiring federal agencies to insure, in consultation with the 
Fish and Wildlife Service or National Marine Fisheries Service, that their actions are “not likely to 
jeopardize” endangered or threatened species or to destroy or adversely modify critical habitat of 
such species); Cal. Dep’t of Water Res., 111 FERC ¶ 62,040 (2005) (temporarily waiving 
hydropower license’s minimum stream flow requirements, based on recommendations of Fish and 
Wildlife Service, to avoid harm to endangered arroyo toads from excessive water releases); Cent. 
Neb. Pub. Power & Irrigation Dist., 14 FERC ¶ 62,009, 63,017 (1981) (amending hydropower 
licenses to include conditions agreed upon in consultation with Fish and Wildlife Service to ensure 
that project did not jeopardize endangered whooping crane or destroy or adversely modify its 
critical habitat).  
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 NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare and to release to the 
public an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before taking 
any major action “significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment.”117 FERC generally applies NEPA to its 
decisions that involve the construction, modification, or 
operation of physical facilities—for example, authorization to 
construct a pipeline under the Natural Gas Act, a hydropower 
license under the Federal Power Act, or authorization for new 
electric transmission facilities.
118
 
 In addition to the environmental requirements that 
environmental statutes apply to energy programs, the energy 
statutes themselves contain some embedded environmental 
provisions. Like environmental statutes, these environmental 
provisions embedded in energy statutes operate by imposing 
environmental requirements on energy programs.
119
 
                                                     
ESA section 7 requires federal agencies to ensure that their actions are not likely to jeopardize the 
continued existence of federally listed endangered or threatened species, or destroy or adversely 
modify the designated critical habitat of such species. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). When an applicant 
for a federal license or permit has reason to believe that an endangered or threatened species may be 
present in the area affected by its project and that the project will likely affect such species, ESA 
section 7 requires the federal agency to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service or National 
Marine Fisheries Service regarding steps that may be necessary to avoid jeopardizing the species. 
Id.  
117. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).  
118. See, e.g., 18 C.F.R. §§ 380.5, 380.6 (2014) (listing activities that require an EA or EIS). For 
these types of decisions, FERC orders frequently address the agency’s compliance with NEPA. See, 
e.g., N. Natural Gas Co., 146 FERC ¶ 61194 (2014); Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 146 FERC 
¶ 61116 (2014); Columbia Gas Transmission, LLC, 146 FERC ¶ 61075 (2014). The agency’s 
compliance with NEPA is often contested in litigation challenging FERC orders. See, e.g., S. Coast 
Air Quality Mgmt. Dist. v. FERC, 621 F.3d 1085, 1092–93 (9th Cir. 2010); Piedmont Envtl. 
Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 315–17 (4th Cir. 2009). With respect to decisions that do not 
directly involve physical facilities, however, FERC has significantly restricted the scope of its 
obligations under NEPA by arguing that many of its decisions do not have environmental impacts 
within NEPA’s purview. See 18 C.F.R. § 380.4(a). FERC’s NEPA regulations, for example, state 
that its decisions approving wholesale electricity rates under the Federal Power Act do not require 
an EIS. See id. § 380.4(a)(15). FERC reasons that (1) its authority to approve “just and reasonable” 
rates under the Federal Power Act does not allow the agency to consider environmental factors; and 
(2) the environmental effects of electricity arise from generating facilities over which the agency 
lacks regulatory authority. See Monongahela Power Co., 39 FERC ¶ 61,350 (1987). FERC’s NEPA 
regulations codify the agency’s decision in Monongahela Power Co. See Regulations Implementing 
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 52 Fed. Reg. 47,897, 47,900 (Dec. 17, 1987) (to be 
codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 157, 380).  
119. See, e.g., Federal Power Act § 4(e), 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (“In deciding whether to issue any 
license under this subchapter for any project, the Commission, in addition to the power and 
development purposes for which licenses are issued, shall give equal consideration to the purposes 
of energy conservation, the protection, mitigation of damage to, and enhancement of, fish and 
wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), the protection of recreational 
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B. Energy Requirements in Environmental Law 
Part II.A focused on environmental requirements that apply to FERC 
regulatory programs under the traditional energy statutes. A parallel 
situation exists within EPA’s jurisdiction under environmental statutes, 
where energy requirements frequently apply. Unlike in FERC’s energy 
statutes, however, where environmental requirements are primarily 
imposed externally by environmental statutes, energy requirements in 
EPA’s jurisdiction arise internally from within environmental statutes 
themselves. Each of the major federal environmental statutes contain 
significant energy requirements. 
The Clean Air Act, in authorizing EPA to regulate air pollutant 
                                                     
opportunities, and the preservation of other aspects of environmental quality.”); id. § 10(a), 16 
U.S.C. § 803(a)(1) (requiring FERC, when issuing a hydropower license, to ensure that the licensed 
project is “adapted to a comprehensive plan for improving or developing a waterway or waterways 
for the use or benefit of interstate or foreign commerce, for the improvement and utilization of 
water-power development, for the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of fish and 
wildlife (including related spawning grounds and habitat), and for other beneficial public uses, 
including irrigation, flood control, water supply, and recreational and other purposes referred to in 
section 797(e) of this title”); id. § 10(i), 16 U.S.C. § 803(j) (“[I]n order to adequately and equitably 
protect, mitigate damages to, and enhance, fish and wildlife (including related spawning grounds 
and habitat) affected by the development, operation, and management of the project, each license 
issued under this subchapter shall include conditions for such protection, mitigation, and 
enhancement . . . based on recommendations received pursuant to the Fish and Wildlife 
Coordination Act (16 U.S.C. 661 et seq.) from the National Marine Fisheries Service, the United 
States Fish and Wildlife Service, and State fish and wildlife agencies.”). This cluster of three related 
provisions in the Federal Power Act explicitly and specifically requires FERC to incorporate 
environmental considerations into its decisions regarding hydropower licenses. See generally 
Michael C. Blumm & Viki A. Nadol, The Decline of the Hydropower Czar and the Rise of Agency 
Pluralism in Hydroelectric Licensing, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 81 (2001); J.R. DeShazo & Jody 
Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 2217 (2005). The provisions 
especially emphasize protection of fish and wildlife and require FERC to coordinate with federal 
and state fish and wildlife agencies to develop conditions to ensure such protection. 16 U.S.C. 
§§ 797(e), 803(a)(1), 803(j). 
In addition to embedded environmental provisions, federal energy statutes contain provisions that 
apply incidentally to environmentally related actions. For example, Federal Power Act section 204 
prohibits public utility companies subject to FERC’s jurisdiction from issuing or assuming liability 
for securities without authorization from FERC. See 16 U.S.C § 824c. Public utilities often issue 
pollution control bonds to finance capital investments in pollution control. When they do so, they 
must obtain FERC approval. See, e.g., Allegheny Energy, Inc., 120 FERC ¶ 62,166 (2007); El Paso 
Elec. Co., 73 FERC ¶ 62,075 (1995). Federal Power Act section 204 applies to many actions by 
public utilities that do not involve pollution control bonds. See, e.g., Trans Bay Cable LLC, 129 
FERC ¶ 62,110 (2009) (authorizing Trans Bay Cable to issue up to $371 million in securities to 
fund a transmission project); Sw. Power Pool, Inc., 120 FERC ¶ 61,160, 61,698–99 (2007) 
(authorizing the Southwest Power Pool to issue up to $50 million in unsecured promissory notes to 
fund various capital expenditures). Even with respect to pollution control bonds, nothing about 
FERC’s approval decision gives any weight to the underlying environmental objectives of the 
bonds. 
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emissions from stationary sources and mobile sources,
120
 generally does 
not prescribe particular emissions limits for such sources, but instead 
directs EPA to establish emissions limits based on pollution control 
technologies that consider various factors such as emissions, other 
environmental impacts, and economic costs.
121
 The statutory definitions 
of the control technologies usually include energy as a factor,
122
 often 
using the term “energy requirements.”123 
In addition to references to energy-related factors in the control 
technologies it prescribes, the Clean Air Act includes provisions that 
require EPA and FERC to coordinate on energy-related environmental 
issues. To alleviate the most severe conflicts between pollution control 
and energy reliability, Clean Air Act section 110(f) allows the President 
to declare a regional energy emergency that exempts fuel-burning 
stationary sources of air pollution from some Clean Air Act 
requirements.
124
 In addition, EPA and FERC have coordinated to 
                                                     
120. See Clean Air Act §§ 101–193, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7515 (stationary sources); id. §§ 202–
250, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521–7590 (mobile sources). See generally supra notes 66–70 and accompanying 
text (summarizing the Clean Air Act). 
121. See, e.g., Clean Air Act § 169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (directing EPA to determine the “best 
available control technology” applicable to a new stationary source by considering “energy, 
environmental, and economic impacts and other costs”); id. § 169A(b)(2), (g)(2), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7491(b)(2), (g)(2) (directing EPA to determine the “best available retrofit technology” applicable 
to “major stationary source” of an air pollutant that contributes to the impairment of visibility by 
considering “the costs of compliance, the energy and nonair quality environmental impacts of 
compliance, any existing pollution control technology in use at the source, the remaining useful life 
of the source, and the degree of improvement in visibility which may reasonably be anticipated to 
result from the use of such technology”); id. § 183(b), (e)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 7511b(b), (e)(1)(A) 
(directing EPA to determine the “best available controls” applicable to certain stationary sources of 
volatile organic compound or PM-10 emissions by considering “technological and economic 
feasibility, health, environmental, and energy impacts”); id. § 202(a)(3)(i), 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(3)(i) 
(directing EPA to establish emissions standards for new vehicles “which reflect the greatest degree 
of emission reduction achievable through the application of technology which the Administrator 
determines will be available for the model year to which such standards apply, giving appropriate 
consideration to cost, energy, and safety factors associated with the application of such 
technology”). 
122. See, e.g., id. § 169(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(3) (directing EPA to consider “energy . . . impacts” 
in determining the “best available control technology” applicable to a new stationary source in a 
Prevention of Significant Deterioration Area); id. § 169A(b)(2), (g)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 7491(b)(2), 
(g)(2) (directing EPA to consider “energy . . . impacts” in determining the “best available retrofit 
technology” applicable to “major stationary source” of an air pollutant that contributes to the 
impairment of visibility). 
123. Id. § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(1) (directing EPA to consider “energy requirements” in 
establishing standards of performance for new stationary sources); id. § 112(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7412(d)(2) (directing EPA to consider “energy requirements” in establishing emissions standards 
for stationary sources of hazardous air pollutants). 
124. Id. § 110(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7410(f). 
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develop policies preventing EPA’s Clean Air Act rules from causing 
reliability problems due to the shutdown of electric generating units that 
cannot comply with EPA’s emissions limits.125 
Other environmental statutes also contain energy requirements: 
 As with the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act does not itself 
establish effluent limits for the pollutant discharges it regulates, 
but instead directs EPA to establish limits based on pollution 
control technologies that consider various factors such as 
effluent reduction benefits, costs, and non-water quality related 
environmental impacts.
126
 Also as in the Clean Air Act, the 
statutory definitions of the control technologies usually include 
                                                     
125. See, e.g., Policy Statement on the Commission’s Role Regarding the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Mercury and Air Toxics Standards, 139 FERC ¶ 61,131 (May 17, 2012); 
Memorandum from Cynthia Giles, Assistant Adm’r of the Office of Enforcement and Compliance 
Assurance, The Environmental Protection Agency’s Enforcement Response Policy for Use of Clean 
Air Act Section 113(a) Administrative Orders in Relation to Electric Reliability and the Mercury 
and Air Toxics Standard (Dec. 16, 2011), available at 
http://www3.epa.gov/mats/pdfs/EnforcementResponsePolicyforCAA113.pdf; see also Bobby 
McMahon, Clark Calls for FERC to Certify EPA Compliance Plan as All Commissioners Back 
‘Safety Valve,’ INSIDE FERC, Sept. 15, 2014, at 1 (describing discussion among FERC 
commissioners about employing a similar policy under EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan). 
126. See, e.g., Clean Water Act § 304(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (2012) (directing EPA 
to determine the “best practicable control technology” applicable to an existing direct discharger by 
considering “the total cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits 
to be achieved from such application, and shall also take into account the age of equipment and 
facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types 
of control techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy 
requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate”); id. § 304(b)(2)(B), 
33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (directing EPA to determine the “best available technology” applicable 
to an existing direct discharger of toxic or non-conventional pollutants by considering “the age of 
equipment and facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application 
of various types of control techniques, process changes, the cost of achieving such effluent 
reduction, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy requirements), and such other 
factors as the Administrator deems appropriate”); id. § 304(b)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) 
(directing EPA to determine the “best conventional pollutant control technology” applicable to an 
existing direct discharger of conventional pollutants by considering “the reasonableness of the 
relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction 
benefits derived, and the comparison of the cost and level of reduction of such pollutants from the 
discharge from publicly owned treatment works to the cost and level of reduction of such pollutants 
from a class or category of industrial sources, and shall take into account the age of equipment and 
facilities involved, the process employed, the engineering aspects of the application of various types 
of control techniques, process changes, non-water quality environmental impact (including energy 
requirements), and such other factors as the Administrator deems appropriate”); id. § 306(a)(1), 
(b)(1)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (directing EPA to determine the “best available 
demonstrated control technology” for new sources based on consideration of “the cost of achieving 
such effluent reduction, and any non-water quality, environmental impact and energy 
requirements”). 
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“energy requirements” as a factor.127 
 Since 1980, RCRA, which regulates the management of 
hazardous wastes, has exempted “drilling fluids, produced 
waters, and other wastes associated with the exploration, 
development, or production of crude oil or natural gas or 
geothermal energy” from regulation as hazardous wastes.128 
Congress enacted the exemption based on its concern that 
regulating such wastes under RCRA “could have a significant 
economic impact on domestic oil and gas exploration and 
production activities.”129 
                                                     
127. See, e.g., id. § 304(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), (b)(43)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B), 
(b)(4)(B) (directing EPA to consider “energy requirements” in establishing effluent limitation 
guidelines for sources and pollutants under the best practicable control technology standard, best 
available control technology standard, and best conventional pollutant control technology, 
respectively). 
128. RCRA § 3001(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2). Because RCRA’s stringent requirements for 
managing hazardous waste contrast with the comparatively lenient regulatory requirements for non-
hazardous solid waste, see Solid Waste Disposal Act §§ 4001–4010, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941–6949a, 
much rides on the classification of waste as hazardous or non-hazardous. See, e.g., Am. Chemistry 
Council v. EPA, 337 F.3d 1060 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Metal Trades, Inc. v. United States, 810 F. Supp. 
689 (D.S.C. 1992); Al Tech Specialty Steel Corp. v. EPA, 846 F.2d 158 (2d Cir. 1988); see also 
City of Chicago v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331 (1994) (noting that hazardous wastes are 
subject to “rigorous safeguards and waste management procedures,” whereas “[n]onhazardous 
wastes are regulated much more loosely”). RCRA’s definition of hazardous waste cuts broadly, 
directing EPA to identify wastes as hazardous based on their “toxicity, persistence, and 
degradability in nature, potential for accumulation in tissue, and other related factors such as 
flammability, corrosiveness, and other hazardous characteristics.” RCRA § 3001(a), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 6921(a). Pursuant to this authority, EPA has promulgated detailed regulations listing specific 
wastes as categorically hazardous and identifying characteristics by which to classify additional 
wastes as hazardous. 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.20–32 (2014).  
129. S. REP. NO. 96-172, at 6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5019, 5025. Congress 
enacted this Bentsen Amendment, named after Senator Lloyd Bentsen of Texas, as part of the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, § 7, 94 Stat. 2334, 2336. The 
Amendment itself only precluded EPA from regulating exploration and production wastes as 
hazardous until the agency had studied their effects on human health and the environment, 
submitted a report to Congress, and made a determination whether regulating such wastes under 
RCRA was warranted. RCRA §§ 3001(b)(2), 8002(m), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921(b), 6982(m). EPA issued 
its report in 1987. See U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, REPORT TO CONGRESS: MANAGEMENT OF 
WASTES FROM THE EXPLORATION, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRODUCTION OF CRUDE OIL, NATURAL 
GAS, AND GEOTHERMAL ENERGY (1987). In 1988, EPA issued a regulatory determination that 
regulating exploration and production wastes under RCRA is not warranted. Regulatory 
Determination for Oil and Gas and Geothermal Exploration, Development, and Production Wastes, 
53 Fed. Reg. 25,446 (July 6, 1988). Thus, exploration and production wastes remain exempt from 
RCRA by EPA action. In September 2010, the Natural Resources Defense Council petitioned EPA 
to regulate exploration and production wastes as hazardous wastes under RCRA. See Letter from 
Amy Mall, Senior Policy Analyst, NRDC, to the Honorable Lisa Jackson, Adm’r, EPA (Sept. 8, 
2010), available at http://docs.nrdc.org/energy/files/ene_10091301a.pdf. The EPA, cognizant of the 
political fallout that would result, seems unlikely to grant the petition See Jeffrey M. Gaba, 
Flowback: Federal Regulation of Wastewater from Hydraulic Fracturing, 39 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 
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 CERCLA, which imposes strict liability on anyone who 
contributes—from generation through disposal—to 
contamination caused by a “release, or threatened release,” of a 
“hazardous substance”130—excludes petroleum.131 CERCLA’s 
legislative history is infamously sparse and opaque, but 
Congress appears to have enacted the petroleum exclusion, as 
with RCRA’s Bentsen Amendment, to avoid economic impacts 
on the oil and gas industry.
132
 
 The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),133 which directs EPA 
and states to regulate “underground injection” of contaminants 
that endanger drinking water sources,
134
 contains two 
exclusions, both energy-related. The SDWA excludes 
“underground injection of natural gas for purposes of storage,” 
and “underground injection of fluids or propping agents (other 
than diesel fuels) pursuant to hydraulic fracturing operations 
related to oil, gas, or geothermal production activities.”135 The 
SDWA includes an additional exemption that precludes EPA 
from issuing regulations that interfere with underground 
injection of oil and gas production fluids or underground 
injection for secondary or tertiary recovery of oil or natural gas, 
unless EPA finds that such regulation would be “essential to 
assure that underground sources of drinking water will not be 
endangered by such injection.”136 
                                                     
251, 279 n.133 (2014) (opining that “it will be a cold day in hell before EPA elects to list oil and gas 
wastes as hazardous”). 
130. CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4); B.F. Goodrich Co. v. Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 
1198 (2d Cir. 1992). 
131. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (“The term ‘hazardous substance’ . . . does not 
include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically 
listed or designated as a hazardous substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this 
paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or 
synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).”). 
132. See Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., The Role of State “Little Superfunds” in Allocation and 
Indemnity Actions Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
Act, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 98 n.105 (1994) (“CERCLA’s petroleum exclusion cannot be justified 
by any health or environmental concern. It was probably included as a political expediency to 
secure the necessary votes from oil producing states.”). 
133. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26. 
134. Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA) § 1421, 42 U.S.C. § 300h. The SDWA prescribes 
national drinking water regulations that contain maximum contaminant levels to protect public 
health. Id. § 1412, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1. 
135. Id. § 1421(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1). 
136. Id. § 1421(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(b)(2). 
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C. Exacerbating the Energy-Environment Divide 
This Part’s descriptions of environmental requirements that apply to 
FERC and energy requirements that apply to EPA may on first thought 
seem to undermine Part I’s argument that an energy-environment divide 
exists. After all, as the examples in this Part show, FERC administers its 
energy statutes subject to significant environmental responsibilities, and 
EPA administers its environmental statutes subject to significant energy 
responsibilities. 
The idea of an energy-environment divide was never, however, 
premised on a complete separation of the two fields. Energy policy and 
environmental policy have long overlapped in application.
137
 The divide 
between energy law and environmental law exists not through separation 
in their application, but by virtue of their conflicting orientations. And 
this highlights the paradox of these environmental and energy 
requirements: although the environmental requirements that apply to 
FERC and the energy requirements that apply to EPA embody an 
overlap between energy law and environmental law, they actually 
exacerbate the energy-environment divide. 
To see how the overlap of energy law and environmental law tends to 
exacerbate the energy-environment divide, consider the role of 
environmental requirements in FERC’s energy programs and the role of 
energy requirements in EPA’s environmental programs. In either 
situation, the applicable environmental requirement or energy 
requirement acts as a negative constraint on the primary goal of the 
program. The ESA may, for example, compel FERC to impose 
limitations on the operation of a hydroelectric project.
138
 Similarly, the 
Safe Drinking Water Act’s exemption for hydraulic fracturing fluids 
limits EPA’s ability to regulate the underground injection of such 
fluids.
139
 
The environmental statutes that apply to FERC impose requirements 
on FERC, and frame those requirements in the negative as limitations on 
the agency’s authority to pursue its objectives under the Federal Power 
Act and other energy statutes. This places FERC in the position of a 
                                                     
137. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (noting that, during the thirteenth and fourteenth 
centuries, English monarchs attempted to prohibit burning coal in London due to poor air quality). 
138. See, e.g., Ala. Power Co. v. FERC, 979 F.2d 1561 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (upholding FERC order 
requiring public utility, pursuant to ESA, to increase the flow of water in the river below its 
hydroelectric dam to reduce the dam’s impact on endangered tulotoma snails). 
139. SDWA § 1421(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 300h(d)(1). 
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regulated entity that must comply with another agency’s requirements,140 
rather than in the position of a regulator that creates and enforces the 
requirements. In other words, environmental statutes make FERC a 
subject, rather than an agent, of their programs. Imposing negative 
constraints on energy programs also signals that environmental 
protection is something different, and apart from, energy policy 
objectives. Whatever the merits of this structure, it inevitably deepens 
the operational divide between the energy statutes that empower FERC 
and the environmental statutes that constrain it. 
A similar divide exists between the environmental statutes that 
empower EPA to regulate and the energy requirements contained within 
those statutes that constrain the agency’s regulatory authority. This 
structure by its very nature sets energy and the environment in 
opposition. It also impairs the efficacy of energy requirements and 
environmental requirements, as agencies generally will be inclined to 
pursue their primary mission and minimize competing requirements.
141
 
FERC’s policies, moreover, have accentuated the divide between its 
energy and environmental regulatory spheres. The agency interprets 
great swathes of its economic regulatory authority under the energy 
statutes to exclude environmental considerations. For example, FERC 
traditionally has taken the position that the “just and reasonable” 
standard under the Federal Power Act encompasses solely economic and 
not environmental considerations.
142
 When FERC does acknowledge a 
role for environmental factors in its decisions, such as when the agency 
authorizes construction of a new pipeline, it largely shunts its 
environmental analysis into a separate analysis, often under the rubric of 
NEPA. Although theoretically it makes sense to consolidate 
environmental analyses into NEPA’s comprehensive framework, in 
practice this can marginalize environmental factors and emphasize the 
                                                     
140. The environmental statutes that apply to FERC are primarily administered by other 
agencies—most notably EPA (Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act), but also the Fish and Wildlife 
Service and National Marine Fisheries Service (ESA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration’s Office of Ocean and CZMA. NEPA provides the notable exception. Although the 
White House Council on Environmental Quality coordinates NEPA policy and implementation, 
administration of the statute is largely left to each agency. See James J. Hoecker, The NEPA 
Mandate and Federal Regulation of the Natural Gas Industry, 13 ENERGY L.J. 265, 275 (1992). 
141. See Rachel E. Barkow, Prosecutorial Administration: Prosecutor Bias and the Department 
of Justice, 99 VA. L. REV. 271, 308 (2013); DeShazo & Freeman, supra note 119, at 2221. 
142. See, e.g., Grand Council of the Crees v. FERC, 198 F.3d 950, 956 (D.C. Cir. 2000) 
(affirming PSI Energy, Inc., 55 FERC ¶ 61,254, 61,811 (1991), and concluding that “potential 
siting, health, safety, environmental or archeological problems are beyond the Commission’s 
authority to consider under sections 205 and 206 of the Federal Power Act”). 
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energy-environment divide.
143
 Indeed, as an example of this, FERC 
often issues one order conditionally approving a new gas pipeline under 
the Natural Gas Act based on “non-environmental” factors and then a 
later order finalizing the approval based on subsequent environmental 
reviews.
144
 
EPA’s energy requirements seem similarly limited in effect. When 
issuing regulations pursuant to statutory provisions that include energy 
requirements, EPA frequently notes that it has considered energy 
impacts in selecting the appropriate control technology.
145
 But EPA 
seldom, if ever, alters its selection of a control technology based on 
energy impacts. Thus, the peripheral roles of environmental 
requirements in energy law and of energy requirements in environmental 
law exacerbate the energy-environment divide. 
III. POLICY ALIGNMENTS BRIDGE THE ENERGY-
ENVIRONMENT DIVIDE 
This Part proposes the use of a different model, policy alignments, to 
bridge the energy-environment divide. Part I and Part II portray a 
somewhat dysfunctional relationship between energy law and 
environmental law. Energy statutes seem narrow and unresponsive to 
environmental concerns. Environmental statutes seem ineffectual and 
marginalized as applied to energy issues. Making matters worse, the 
overlap between the two fields is managed primarily by requirements 
that attempt to impose negative environmental requirements on energy 
programs and negative energy requirements on environmental programs. 
It seems clear that this existing divide in law departs dramatically from 
                                                     
143. See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing 
Government’s Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 905 (2002) (noting critiques 
of “the temporal and functional gulf that separates the ritualized procedures of EIS production from 
agencies’ real decision making processes”). 
144. See, e.g., Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 100 FERC ¶ 61,311 (2002) (issuing conditional 
certificate of public convenience and necessity for construction and operation of gas pipeline and 
associated facilities); Alliance Pipeline L.P., 80 FERC ¶ 61,149 (1997) (same); Wyo.-Cal. Pipeline 
Co., 45 FERC ¶ 61,353 (1988) (same). 
145. See Promulgation of Air Quality Implementation Plans: Arizona; Regional Haze and 
Interstate Visibility Transport Federal Implementation Plan, 79 Fed. Reg. 52,420, 52,443 (Sept. 3, 
2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 52) (concluding that the agency’s proposed option for 
controlling air emissions from a copper smelter entailed energy requirements that would be 
“reasonable given the significant emission reductions and associated visibility benefits”); Effluent 
Limitations Guidelines and New Source Performance Standards for the Airport Deicing Category, 
77 Fed. Reg. 29,168, 29,196–97 (May 16, 2012) (to be codified at 40 CFR pts. 9, 449) 
(summarizing the energy requirements associated with regulatory options for controlling water 
pollutant discharges associated with airport deicing). 
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the close factual interrelationship that exists between energy and the 
environment. 
Responding to this dysfunction, some scholars have attacked the legal 
separation between economic regulation and environmental regulation, 
arguing in favor of merging energy law and environmental law to undo 
the harmful effects of the environmental-energy divide.
146
 It is unclear, 
however, what a merger would entail, either doctrinally, institutionally, 
or politically. A full integration of energy and environmental regulation 
would necessitate significant changes to existing laws, policies, and 
institutions. Such changes would face enormous obstacles. FERC, for 
example, has spent decades carefully cabining its regulatory authority to 
focus on economic regulation, with considerable success in the courts.
147
 
Broadening FERC’s authority to encompass externalities and other 
market failures, as some have advocated,
148
 would fundamentally re-
orient the agency in ways that would likely generate significant 
opposition from both inside and outside the agency—and perhaps from 
courts as well. In light of these problems, it would be beneficial to 
identify alternative means of addressing the energy-environment divide. 
Convergence, however, does not necessarily entail merger into a 
unified whole. Convergence also can occur through the development of 
similar and compatible characteristics in systems that otherwise maintain 
independence, in the process accomplishing reconciliation through 
alignment rather than merger. An alignment-based strategy could thus 
bridge the energy-environment divide by aligning federal energy policy 
and federal environmental policy without merging the regulatory 
programs of FERC and EPA.
149
 
                                                     
146. See, e.g., Amy J. Wildermuth, The Next Step: The Integration of Energy Law and 
Environmental Law, 31 UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 369, 383–88 (2011) (proposing an integration of 
energy and environmental law); Davies, supra note 11, at 504 (advocating a “marriage” that would 
result in “a merged body of energy-environmental law”). 
147. See supra note 142 and accompanying text (noting FERC’s position that the “just and 
reasonable” standard under the Federal Power Act encompasses solely economic and not 
environmental considerations). 
148. See Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the 
Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275, 329–30 (2014) (arguing that FERC can issue 
regulations that internalize externalities from carbon emissions in wholesale electricity sales); 
Brandon Hofmeister, Roles for State Energy Regulators in Climate Change Mitigation, 2 MICH. J. 
ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 67, 112 n.199 (2012) (proposing that FERC could reinterpret the Federal 
Power Act “to include environmental externalities in determining when rates are just and 
reasonable”); 2 STEVEN WEISSMAN & ROMANY WEBB, ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT 
LEGISLATION § 3.2 (2014) (contending that Federal Power Act section 205, which authorizes FERC 
to regulate the rates, terms, and conditions of the wholesale electricity market, gives the agency 
authority to include a “carbon adder” in wholesale electricity rates).  
149. See Klass, supra note 11, at 189–200 (examining state initiatives to mitigate climate change 
 
04 - Aagaard.docx (Do Not Delete) 12/21/2015  8:07 PM 
2015] ENERGY-ENVIRONMENT POLICY ALIGNMENTS 1547 
 
The remainder of this Part explores the use of policy alignments to 
manage the energy-environment relationship. Part III.A identifies four 
recent examples of policies FERC has adopted, pursuant to traditional 
authority over wholesale electric power rates under the Federal Power 
Act, that align with environmental objectives. Part III.B highlights two 
examples, one from the 1990s and one very recent, in which EPA, acting 
pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act, adopts policies that 
align with energy objectives. Part III.C examines the implications of 
using policy alignments to address the energy-environment divide. 
A. Energy Policies that Align with Environmental Objectives 
When Congress enacted the Federal Power Act in 1935, the electric 
power industry was dominated by vertically integrated utilities that 
owned and operated their own power plants, transmission lines, and 
local distribution systems.
150
 Under both the Federal Power Act and state 
regulation, electric utilities exercised government-protected monopoly 
power, in exchange for incurring certain obligations with respect to 
customers in their service areas.
151
 The utilities’ customers paid a single 
charge that included all the costs associated with providing power—
generation, transmission, and distribution.
152
 Economies of scale in 
power generation led utilities to rely on large, centralized power 
plants.
153
 
Dramatic changes spurred by economic, legal, and technological 
factors have moved the electric power sector away from this traditional 
model.
154
 Rising petroleum prices, inflation, and new environmental 
                                                     
through energy policy, and in doing so highlighting ways in which policies can create linkages 
between energy law and environmental law without a convergence of the two fields). 
150. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002) (“In 1935, when the FPA became law, most 
electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities that had constructed their own power plants, 
transmission lines, and local delivery systems.”). 
151. See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 CONN. L. 
REV. 1339, 1349 (2010) (summarizing this “regulatory compact”); Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and 
Future of Electricity Regulation, 32 ENVTL. L. 435, 438 (2002) (“Traditional utilities were immune 
from competition in their monopoly protected service areas . . . .”). 
152. See New York, 535 U.S. at 5 (noting that electricity sales were “bundled”). 
153. See Peter C. Carstensen, Creating Workably Competitive Wholesale Markets in Energy: 
Necessary Conditions, Structure, and Conduct, 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 91 (2005) 
(“In the case of production of electricity, the conventional wisdom up to the 1970s was that there 
were economies of scale as generation facilities got larger and larger.”); Peter Navarro, A 
Guidebook and Research Agenda for Restructuring the Electricity Industry, 16 ENERGY L.J. 347, 
350 (1995) (noting that, for the first fifty years of regulation of the electric power industry, 
“[u]tilities built ever larger and larger power plants to capture economies of scale”). 
154. See New York, 535 U.S. at 5 (noting “dramatic changes in the power industry that have 
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regulations changed the cost structure of electric power generation, 
upsetting settled expectations of stable rates and economies of scale.
155
 
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),
156
 which 
required utilities to purchase power from “qualifying facilities” at rates 
that turned out to be quite favorable to the facilities,
157
 enabled and 
incentivized independent generators to enter the market.
158
 
Technological developments allowed the creation of large interstate 
electric power networks, or “grids,” that have enabled utilities to 
transmit electricity over long distances at relatively low costs.
159
 
Although certainly not the only contributor, FERC has been a key 
driver of the transformation of the electric power industry. In 1996, 
FERC issued its landmark Order 888, which required public utilities to 
provide non-discriminatory open access transmission services,
160
 
effectively breaking utilities’ monopoly control of the interstate 
transmission market. As the legal basis for Order 888, FERC cited its 
longstanding authority under Federal Power Act section 206 to ensure 
that wholesale electric power rates are just, reasonable, and non-
discriminatory.
161
 
Since 1996, FERC has continued to take actions aimed at bringing 
                                                     
occurred in recent decades”); Paul L. Joskow, Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in 
the U.S. Electricity Sector, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 119, 119 (1997) (noting “dramatic changes” in the 
electric power sector); Jonas Monast & David Hoppock, Designing CO2 Performance Standards for 
a Transitioning Electricity Sector: A Multi-Benefits Framework, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 11068, 11069 (2014) (“A number of market, regulatory, and technological factors 
occurring in a relatively short time frame are resulting in dramatic changes throughout the 
electricity sector . . . .”). 
155. See Navarro, supra note 153, at 350; Tomain, supra note 151, at 450. 
156. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.). 
157. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) § 210, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3 (2012). 
158. See Navarro, supra note 153, at 351; Tomain, supra note 151, at 451–53. 
159. See, e.g., New York, 535 U.S. at 7–8 (describing the development of interconnected electric 
power networks). 
160. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 
35, 385) [hereinafter Order 888]. 
161. Id. at 21,560 (“[W]e conclude that we have ample legal authority—indeed, a 
responsibility—under section 206 of the FPA [16 U.S.C. § 824e] to order the filing of non-
discriminatory open access transmission tariffs if we find such order necessary as a remedy for 
undue discrimination or anticompetitive effects.”). The Energy Policy Act of 1992 had authorized 
FERC to issue orders to individual utilities requiring them to provide transmission services to 
unaffiliated wholesale generators. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824j–824k. With Order 888, FERC applied the 
rationale for such orders to the entire industry, undertaking “a marketwide remedy for a marketwide 
problem.” New York, 535 U.S. at 14. 
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competition to wholesale power markets.
162
 These legal developments 
have coincided with other technical and economic innovations that have 
moved the electric power industry away from vertically integrated 
monopolies and towards the development of smaller, less centralized 
power services.
163
 Some of these power services will comprise what has 
become known as the Smart Grid—”a radically upgraded national 
electric network” that will “provid[e] consumers with dramatic new 
ways to make, use, and conserve electricity.”164 In addition to its 
economic implications for the power sector,
165
 this new wave of power 
services has potentially significant environmental ramifications.
166
 This 
section summarizes four FERC regulatory initiatives that, although 
founded on the agency’s traditional economic ratemaking authority 
under the Federal Power Act, have the potential to produce substantial 
environmental benefits from the energy sector. 
1. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation 
Congestion in electricity transmission systems poses a significant and 
recurring challenge to efforts to maintain an electric grid that meets 
current and evolving energy needs. Transmission congestion leads to 
imbalances between supply and demand that increase the price of 
electricity and threaten grid reliability.
167
 These imbalances also can 
allow transmission owners and generators to exercise market power that 
undermines competition.
168
 In addition, inadequate transmission capacity 
hinders the development of new renewable energy generation resources. 
Renewable energy development often depends on transmission 
                                                     
162. See Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. 
49,846, 49,847 (Aug. 19, 2003) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 2003] (“The 
Commission continues to work to encourage fully competitive bulk power markets.”). 
163. See Order 2006, supra note 7, at 34,191 (“Where the electric industry was once primarily the 
domain of vertically integrated utilities generating power at large centralized plants, advances in 
technology have created a burgeoning market for small power plants . . . .”). 
164. Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 HARV. ENVTL. L. 
REV. 1, 2–3 (2013). 
165. See Elisabeth Graffy & Steven Kihm, Does Disruptive Competition Mean a Death Spiral for 
Electric Utilities?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 1, 1 (2014) (noting “a wave of innovation in energy markets that 
manifests as disruptive competition for electric utilities”). 
166. See Order 2006, supra note 7, at 34,191 (noting that new technologies “may offer economic, 
reliability, or environmental benefits”). 
167. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL ELECTRIC TRANSMISSION CONGESTION STUDY vii 
(2009). 
168. See Sandeep Vaheesan, Market Power in Power Markets: The Filed-Rate Doctrine and 
Competition in Electricity, 46 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 921, 931–32 (2013). 
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connecting generation-favorable areas, such as the wind corridor that 
runs north-south through the central United States, to heavily populated 
metropolitan areas that would use the renewable-generated power.
169
 
Recognizing the challenge that transmission congestion poses, FERC 
has acted to induce more effective transmission planning. In 2007, 
FERC issued Order 890,
170
 which required transmission providers to 
develop a transmission planning process that satisfies nine specified 
principles.
171
 FERC hoped that enhanced transmission planning would 
promote increased competition in wholesale electricity markets, leading 
to just and reasonable rates.
172
 
By 2010, however, FERC concluded that, although Order 890’s 
transmission planning mandate had spurred significant transmission 
planning efforts, more was needed to ensure that transmission planning 
would be efficient and cost-effective.
173
 Accordingly, in 2011, FERC 
issued Order 1000,
174
 which has generated considerable excitement
175
 as 
well as controversy
176
 and undeniably represents an important 
                                                     
169. See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for 
Renewable Energy: A Federalism Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801, 1811–12 (2012). 
170. Preventing Undue Discrimination and Preference in Transmission Service, 72 Fed. Reg. 
12,266 (Feb. 16, 2007) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 37) [hereinafter Order 890]. 
171. The nine transmission planning principles Order 890 requires are: (1) coordination; (2) 
openness; (3) transparency; (4) information exchange; (5) comparability; (6) dispute resolution; (7) 
regional participation; (8) economic planning studies; and (9) cost allocation for new projects. See 
generally id. 
172. Order 890, supra note 170, at 12,266. 
173. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating 
Public Utilities, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,884, 37,889 (proposed June 30, 2010) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. 
pt. 35). 
174. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public 
Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49,842 (Aug. 11, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 
1000]. 
175. See Adam James & Whitney Allen, FERC Order 1000: The Most Exciting Energy 
Regulation You’ve Never Heard of, CLIMATE PROGRESS (Oct. 22, 2012, 11:30 AM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/climate/2012/10/22/1059091/ferc-order-1000-the-most-exciting-energy-
regulation-youve-never-heard-of/; Kevin Jones & Colin Beckman, FERC’s Order 1000 Seeks to 
Overhaul Electricity Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation, VERMONT LAW TOP 10 
ENVIRONMENTAL WATCH LIST 2012, http://watchlist.vermontlaw.edu/bonus-ferc-transmission-
rules/ (describing Order 1000 as “an ambitious new policy that aims to accomplish two sizable goals 
simultaneously”). 
176. Numerous parties, including state regulatory agencies, electric transmission providers, 
regional transmission organizations, and industry trade associations, petitioned for review of Order 
1000 in the D.C. Circuit. In August 2014, the D.C. Circuit unanimously upheld Order 1000 against 
the petitioners’ challenges, holding that Order 1000 is consistent with FERC’s authority under the 
Federal Power Act and that the agency acted reasonably in issuing Order 1000. See S.C. Pub. Serv. 
Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 
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development in U.S. energy policy.
177
 
Order 1000, issued pursuant to Federal Power Act section 206,
178
 
requires four specific changes to transmission planning and cost 
allocation: regional transmission planning, elimination of a federal right 
of first refusal, coordinated interregional transmission planning, and cost 
allocation. First, Order 1000 strengthens Order 890’s requirements for 
regional transmission planning.
179
 Order 1000 requires that regional 
transmission planning processes must evaluate transmission alternatives 
at the regional, not just local, level;
180
 to give comparable consideration 
to transmission and non-transmission alternatives;
181
 and to consider 
state and federal Public Policy Requirements that affect transmission 
needs.
182
 Second, Order 1000 eliminates a federal right of first refusal to 
transmission facilities.
183
 Third, Order 1000 requires public utility 
                                                     
177. See Emily Holden, FERC Hears Slew of Order No. 1000 Complaints, CQ ROLL CALL (Aug. 
22, 2013), available at 2013 WL 4477061 (referring to Order 1000 as a “landmark” regulation); 
FERC Order 1000-A Challenge for State PUCs, 4033 PUR UTIL. REG. NEWS, Aug. 19, 2011, at 1 
(same). 
178. 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012). Section 206 empowers FERC to “determine the just and 
reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract” affecting a “rate, 
charge, or classification” by a public utility for transmission or sale of electricity within FERC’s 
jurisdiction. Id. 
179. Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,845, 49,854–80. 
180. Id. at 49,845; see also id. at 49,867 (noting that Order 890 allowed regional transmission 
planning that merely confirmed that local transmission plans within a region did not conflict with 
each other). FERC noted that examining alternatives at the regional level expands the range of 
alternatives that can be considered, which can lead transmission providers to identify options that 
may resolve transmission needs more efficiently or cost-effectively than the narrower range of 
solutions identified at the local level. Id. at 49,856. For example, transmission facilities that span the 
service territories of multiple local providers may meet transmission needs more efficiently than if 
each local provider plans and constructs its own facilities. Id. at 49,857. 
181. Id. at 49,869. 
182. Id. at 49,876. Regional planning must affirmatively consider how Public Policy 
Requirements may affect future transmission needs, and evaluate solutions for meeting those needs. 
Id. at 49,877. FERC defined Public Policy Requirements broadly to include any regulation that 
drives transmission needs. Id. at 49,878. FERC Order 1000-A subsequently clarified that Public 
Policy Requirements include local, as well as state and federal, regulations that drive transmission 
needs. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating Public 
Utilities, 77 Fed. Reg. 32,184, 32,234 (May 31, 2012) (to be codified 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter 
Order 1000-A]. 
183. Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,845. Prior regulations allowed incumbent transmission 
developers to hold rights of first refusal to construct new transmission facilities within their service 
territories. Id. at 49,880–81. FERC concluded that such rights of first refusal gave an undue 
preference to incumbent transmission providers over non-incumbent transmission providers, 
creating barriers to entry that potentially increase the cost of developing new transmission facilities. 
Id. at 49,886. Order 1000 eliminates the right of first refusal only for transmission facilities 
developed through regional planning; it leaves intact, for example, a public utility’s ability to build 
new transmission facilities within its own retail distribution service territory—provided the facilities 
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transmission providers to coordinate their transmission planning 
interregionally.
184
 Fourth, Order 1000 requires public utility transmission 
providers to adopt cost allocation methods for new transmission 
facilities selected in a regional transmission plan or through interregional 
transmission planning.
185
 
Transmission planning, and Order 1000’s requirements in particular, 
have important environmental implications, especially for the 
development of renewable energy. Renewable energy poses particular 
challenges for transmission because the best sites for renewable energy 
projects are often located far from urban and suburban areas, where 
electricity demand is centered.
186
 New transmission facilities are then 
needed to connect renewable energy projects to population centers.
187
 By 
facilitating transmission planning, especially across broader areas, Order 
1000 should reduce the obstacles to renewable energy development.
188
 
Order 1000 also should make transmission planning more responsive to 
renewable portfolio standards and state laws that require certain 
percentages of power to come from renewable energy sources.
189
 
Renewable portfolio standards are an example of Public Policy 
Requirements that must be considered in regional transmission planning 
under Order 1000.
190
 
Order 1000 also has important ramifications for energy efficiency and 
demand response. Energy efficiency and demand response, both of 
                                                     
are not submitted for regional cost allocation. Id. at 49,887. FERC has subsequently clarified, and to 
some extent limited, Order 1000’s elimination of rights of first refusal. See Order 1000-A, supra 
note 182, at 32,249–52. 
184. Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,846, 49,900–18. FERC concluded that, just as local 
transmission planning can neglect more efficient and cost-effective regional alternatives, see supra 
note 180 and accompanying text, regional transmission planning can overlook more efficient and 
cost-effective interregional alternatives, Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,901. To facilitate 
interregional planning, Order 1000 requires transmission providers to create interregional planning 
processes and to exchange data and information across neighboring regions, with the goal of 
identifying and evaluating potential interregional transmission facilities. Id.  
185. Id. at 49,846. These methods must allocate costs in rough proportion to benefits received—
thus, a transmission provider may not allocate costs of a new transmission facility to someone who 
does not benefit from the facility. Id. Benefits of new transmission include, but are not limited to, 
reliability, cost savings, congestion relief, and meeting Public Policy Requirements. Id. at 49,937. 
186. See Shelley Welton & Michael B. Gerrard, FERC Order 1000 as a New Tool for Promoting 
Energy Efficiency and Demand Response, 42 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 11,025, 11,026–27 
(2012). 
187. Id. at 11,027. 
188. Id. 
189. Sharon Buccino, Smart from the Start - Good Planning Promises Sustainable Energy 
Future, 27 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 369, 381 (2012). 
190. Id.; Amy L. Stein, The Tipping Point of Federalism, 45 CONN. L. REV. 217, 275 (2012). 
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which reduce demand for electric power, have the potential to reduce the 
need for additional transmission facilities.
191
 Energy efficiency and 
demand response therefore fall within the category of what Order 1000 
refers to as “non-transmission alternatives.”192 FERC’s direction that 
regional transmission planning processes must give comparable 
consideration to transmission and non-transmission alternatives has the 
potential to stimulate the development of energy efficiency and demand 
response, with consequential environmental benefits.
193
 
Numerous nonprofit environmental advocacy organizations—for 
example, Conservation Law Foundation, Environmental Defense Fund, 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Clean Air Council, and 
Earthjustice—commented during FERC’s rulemaking process for Order 
1000.
194
 Environmental advocates argued in favor of, for example, 
including non-transmission alternatives,
195
 public participation,
196
 and 
explicit consideration of environmental benefits
197
 in transmission 
planning. 
FERC did not cite environmental protection as a direct policy 
justification for Order 1000, despite the significant environmental 
implications of the Order and the arguments of environmental advocates 
citing Order 1000’s beneficial environmental consequences. Instead, 
FERC hewed closely to the language of Federal Power Act section 206, 
repeatedly tying its determinations to findings that the transmission 
planning and cost allocation requirements it was imposing would 
“ensure that Commission-jurisdictional transmission services are 
provided at just and reasonable rates and on a basis that is just and 
reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.”198 
Environmental policy objectives did, however, provide an indirect policy 
justification for Order 1000, insofar as Order 1000 effectuates federal 
and state policies—what it calls Public Policy Requirements—some of 
which are explicitly environmental.
199
 But Order 1000 does not actually 
                                                     
191. Welton & Gerrad, supra note 186, at 11,027. 
192. Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,869. 
193. See Welton & Gerrard, supra note 186, at 11,027–28 (noting how Order 1000’s mandate to 
consider non-transmission alternatives has the potential to stimulate energy efficiency and demand-
size measures, but raising questions about whether Order 1000 will effectively place transmission 
and non-transmission alternatives on equal footing). 
194. See Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,865, 49,873, 49,967. 
195. See id. at 49,865. 
196. See id. at 49,866. 
197. See id. at 49,946. 
198. Id. at 49,842. 
199. See Stein, supra note 190, at 275 (noting that the term Public Policy Requirements “is broad 
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adopt or internalize the objectives underlying the Public Policy 
Requirements—indeed, FERC declined even to define exactly what 
policy objectives Public Policy Requirements encompass.
200
 Instead, 
Order 1000 just accepts those Public Policy Requirements as given. 
2. Demand Response 
Demand response refers to reductions in electric energy 
consumption—nicknamed “negawatts”—in response to an increase in 
price or to incentive payments.
201
 These demand reductions can 
substitute for additional electricity generation that otherwise would be 
required to meet demand.
202
 Demand response can include load-shifting 
measures, which transfer energy usage from relatively high-cost periods 
to lower-cost periods, and load-reducing measures, which reduce net 
energy usage.
203
 Demand response can be especially useful to help the 
grid match supply and demand during peak periods, when heavy load 
stresses the grid and causes wholesale electricity spot prices to spike.
204
 
In recent years, FERC has issued a series of orders that facilitate 
development and integration of demand response resources into 
wholesale power markets. Demand response can thus bid into the supply 
side of wholesale power markets, competing with electricity generation 
as a means of meeting demand. The two most significant of FERC’s 
demand response orders, Order 719 (2008)
205
 and Order 745 (2011),
206
 
                                                     
enough to encompass a large range of federal interests that can include environmental priorities”). 
To be clear, Public Policy Requirements include, but are not limited to, environmental policies. 
Moreover, some Public Policy Requirements, such as renewable energy portfolio standards, may 
have justifications that include, but are not limited to, environmental protection. See Davies, supra 
note 151, at 1358 (noting “wide-ranging rationales” for renewable portfolio standards). 
200. Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,878. 
201. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., A Primer on Demand Response and a Critique of FERC Order 
745, 3 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY & ENVTL. L. 102, 104 (2012) (“Negawatt is a term that is sometimes 
used to equate a unit of electricity saved to a unit consumed, i.e., a megawatt conserved.”). 
202. See John C. Hilke, Comments on Peter Carstensen’s “Creating Workably Competitive 
Wholesale Markets in Energy,” 1 ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 155, 166 (2005) (noting that 
demand response “effectively converts many customers into potential suppliers of ‘negawatts’—
reduced consumption that can substitute for generation”). 
203. See BRANDON DAVITO ET AL., THE SMART GRID AND THE PROMISE OF DEMAND-SIDE 
MANAGEMENT 38–39 (2010).  
204. Cf. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE & 
ADVANCED METERING 5 (2008), [hereinafter ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE], available at 
http://www.ferc.gov/legal/staff-reports/demand-response.pdf (stating that demand response is 
“centered on critical hours during a day or year when demand is high or when reserve margins are 
low”). 
205. Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100 
(Oct. 28, 2008) (codified at 18 C.F.R. § 35.28) [hereinafter Order 719]. 
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essentially directed wholesale market system operators—Regional 
Transmission Organizations (RTOs) and Independent System Operators 
(ISOs)
207—to treat demand response resources more like electric power 
generators.
208
 In short, Order 719 and Order 745 require RTOs and ISOs 
to treat negawatts more like megawatts. 
Order 719 did not aim exclusively at demand response, but instituted 
a series of measures, which FERC intended to increase competition in 
organized wholesale electric power markets.
209
 Many of the measures, 
however, either focus specifically on demand response or benefit 
demand response.
210
 The most important of these measures require 
RTOs and ISOs to permit demand response resources to bid directly into 
organized wholesale energy markets
211
 and competitive markets for 
ancillary services.
212
 FERC reasoned that enabling demand response to 
                                                     
206. Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets, 76 Fed. Reg. 
16,658 (Mar. 24, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 745]. 
207. RTOs and ISOs regionally coordinate planning, operation, and use of the electric 
transmission grid. Guide to Market Oversight: Glossary, FED. ENERGY REG. COMMISSION, 
http://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/glossary.asp (last visited Nov. 18, 2015); see also 18 
C.F.R. § 35.34 (2015) (governing RTOs). 
208. In addition to the broad policy directives contained in Order 719 and Order 745, FERC has 
issued orders regarding the measurement and verification of demand response in organized 
wholesale power markets. See Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for 
Public Utilities, 78 Fed. Reg. 14,654 (Mar. 7, 2013) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 38) [hereinafter 
Order 676-G]; Standards for Business Practices and Communication Protocols for Public Utilities, 
75 Fed. Reg. 20,901 (Apr. 22, 2010) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 38) [hereinafter Order 676-F]. 
FERC also has issued narrower orders addressing demand response in specific markets. See, e.g., 
Order 719, supra note 205, at 64,103; Demand Response Supporters, 145 FERC ¶ 61,162 (2013); 
Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, 137 FERC ¶ 61,212 (2011); PJM Interconnection, 146 
FERC ¶ 61,052 (2014). 
209. Order 719, supra note 205, at 64,100. Order 719 also imposes other requirements on RTOs 
and ISOs. They must allow demand response resources to specify limits on the number of hours, 
number of times per day, and amount of electric energy reduction they are bidding in the ancillary 
services market. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(i)(B). They may not assess charges on electric power 
purchasers for reducing their purchases during times of shortage or during periods of load 
reductions to avoid a shortage. Id. § 35.28(g)(1)(ii). They must allow prices to rebalance supply and 
demand during periods of operating reserve shortage. Id. § 35.28(g)(1)(iv). They must provide a 
Web-based platform for market participants to offer to buy or sell power on a long-term basis. Id. 
§ 35.28(g)(2). They must take measures to increase the effectiveness of their Market Monitoring 
Units. Id. § 35.28(g)(3). They must release their offer and bid data. Id. § 35.28(g)(5). They must 
adopt practices and procedures to make their boards of directors responsive to customers and other 
stakeholders. Id. § 35.28(g)(6). 
210. See Order 719, supra note 205,  at 64,100 (noting demand response as an area addressed by 
Order 719). 
211. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(iii). An organized wholesale energy market is a competitive day-
ahead and/or real-time market. Order 719, supra note 205,  at 64,101. 
212. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(i)(A). FERC defines ancillary services as “[t]hose services 
necessary to support the transmission of electric power from seller to purchaser, given the 
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participate more effectively in power markets increases competition in 
those markets, promoting just and reasonable rates.
213
 
Unlike Order 719, Order 745 focuses on demand response, and 
specifically on the compensation paid to demand response resources that 
participate in wholesale energy markets. Building on Order 719, which 
required RTOs and ISOs to allow demand response resources to 
participate in organized wholesale energy markets, Order 745 requires 
RTOs and ISOs to pay demand response resources the market price for 
energy—that is, the same price received by generators selling power into 
wholesale markets.
214
 
Because demand response reduces or redistributes consumption (and 
therefore generation) of electric power, it has potentially significant 
environmental effects. Several nonprofit environmental organizations 
commenting on FERC’s proposed rules argued that demand response 
creates important environmental benefits by displacing fossil fuel-
combusting electricity generation, either directly by reducing overall 
demand
215
 or indirectly by facilitating the integration of variable 
renewable resources such as wind and solar into the grid.
216
 Some 
energy law scholars have similarly argued that demand response can 
“reduc[e] greenhouse gas emissions and the need for constructing new 
power plants.”217 
Generator-affiliated commenters, on the other hand, argued that 
incentivizing demand response would lead power customers to reduce 
their purchases of grid power by increasing their use of off-grid power, 
for example from on-site diesel generators. These off-grid power sources 
                                                     
obligations of control areas and transmitting utilities within those control areas, to maintain reliable 
operations of the interconnected transmission system.” Guide to Market Oversight: Glossary, supra 
note 207.  
213. Order 719, supra note 205, at 64,101.  
214. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(1)(v). See generally Joel Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?: 
FERC’s Authority over Demand Response Compensation in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 SAN 
DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 69 (2013)  Eisen’s Article offers legal and policy justifications for 
Order 745. Richard Pierce, by contrast, has expressed skepticism about Order 745, including its 
ability to effectively internalize the environmental externalities associated with electric power 
generation. See Pierce, supra note 201, at 107. But see id. at 109 (nevertheless concluding that 
Order 745 “offers the prospect of some marginal improvement in the performance of U.S. electricity 
markets”).  
215. Order 745, supra note 206, at 16,664 (noting comments on the uninternalized environmental 
externalities that result from fossil fuel generated electricity as compared with demand response). 
216. See Order 719, supra note 205, at 64,104 (“Public Interest Organizations assert that the 
presence of demand response in these markets will mitigate the exercise of market power and allow 
large amounts of variable resources (e.g., wind and solar) to be integrated into the grid.”). 
217. Eisen, supra note 214, at 71. 
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may produce more emissions than grid power generation.
218
 Some 
scholars and analysts have expressed a similar concern that demand 
response may actually increase carbon emissions. This is because 
demand response, responding to economic incentives, may shift 
electricity use from high-cost peak load periods to lower-cost off peak 
periods. But more generation during off peak periods comes from coal-
fired power plants, whereas generation during peak load involves more 
relatively low-emission natural gas plants.
219
 
FERC’s own analysis has been cautious, referring to “possible 
environmental benefits” from demand response.220 FERC notes that 
“[d]emand response may provide environmental benefits by reducing 
generation plants’ emissions during peak periods,” but also that 
“[r]eductions during peak periods should be balanced against possible 
emissions increases during off-peak hours, as well as from increased use 
of on-site generation.”221 FERC’s Orders 719 and 745 do not ascribe any 
environmental benefits to demand response. 
To some extent, FERC’s reticence to consider the environmental 
implications of demand response may reflect the factual uncertainty over 
those implications. But FERC’s reticence likely also reflects its 
continuing legal position that the just and reasonable standard does not 
incorporate environmental considerations.
222
 Supportive of this 
conclusion, FERC exempted Order 719 and Order 745 from NEPA 
review on the ground that it merely involved “rates and charges for the 
transmission or sale [of electric energy].”223 
The overall environmental effect of demand response likely depends 
                                                     
218. Order 745, supra note 206, at 16,664 (citing the comment of the Electric Power Supply 
Association); see also U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-73, ELECTRICITY MARKETS: 
DEMAND-RESPONSE ACTIVITIES HAVE INCREASED, BUT FERC COULD IMPROVE DATA 
COLLECTION AND REPORTING EFFORTS 46 (2014) (noting that “[s]ome consumers may use backup 
generators . . . to generate electricity to offset some or all of their demand reductions” and that such 
generators “may be more polluting than the power plants serving the grid”). 
219. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., THE GREEN GRID: ENERGY SAVINGS AND CARBON 
EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS ENABLED BY A SMART GRID 6-5 (2008); Sharon B. Jacobs, Bypassing 
Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100 IOWA L. REV. 885, 926–27 (2015); 
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jim Rossi, Good for You, Bad for Us: The Financial Disincentive for 
Net Demand Reduction, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1527, 1541–43 (2012). 
220. See ASSESSMENT OF DEMAND RESPONSE, supra note 204, at 6. 
221. Id. 
222. See Regulations Implementing National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 52 Fed. Reg. 
47,897, 47,900 (Dec. 17, 1987) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 2, 157, 380); Monongahela Power 
Co., 39 FERC ¶ 61,350, 62,096–97 (1987). 
223. Order 745, supra note 206, at 16,677 (citing 18 C.F.R. § 380.4(a)(15)); Wholesale 
Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets, 73 Fed. Reg. 64,100, 64,165 (Oct. 28, 
2008) (to be codified at 18 C. F. R. pt. 35) (citing 18 C. F. R. § 380.4(a)(15)). 
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on the relative balance between load-shifting measures and load-
reducing measures.
224
 Load-shifting measures are not likely to reduce 
(and may even increase) energy use and emissions,
225
 whereas load-
reducing measures reduce energy use and emissions. The available 
evidence suggests that demand response measures will tend to reduce 
energy use and emissions.
226
 The evidence also indicates that demand 
response’s indirect environmental effects, which operate by facilitating 
greater integration of renewable energy generation, will have an even 
greater environmental benefit.
227
 
Because of the differing impacts of load-shifting versus load-reducing 
demand response, whether demand response results in environmental 
benefits depends, to a significant extent, on how it is managed and what 
forms of demand response are incentivized. Under FERC’s 
interpretation, ratified by the courts, the Federal Power Act gives FERC 
little, if any, authority to regulate energy transactions. This includes 
demand response, for the direct purpose of accomplishing environmental 
objectives.
228
 Other federal, state, and local regulators, however, do have 
that authority. Pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air Act, for 
example, EPA regulates diesel generators that are sometimes used for 
on-site generation as part of demand response.
229
 Included in these 
                                                     
224. See DAVITO ET AL., supra note 203 and accompanying text (explaining how demand 
response utilizes both load-shifting and load-reducing measures). 
225. But see Carl Imhoff, Policies Get Smart, PUB. UTIL. FORT., June 1, 2008, at 28 (contending 
that even load-shifting demand response measures can reduce emissions by shifting load from peak 
periods served by less efficient peaking plants to “shoulder periods” served by more efficient 
plants). 
226. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 219, at 6-2 to 6-5 (citing results of an 
assessment of California concluding that demand response technology results in net energy savings 
and a study modeling New England concluding that demand response reduces emissions of carbon 
dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur oxides); NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC., CARBON DIOXIDE 
REDUCTIONS FROM DEMAND RESPONSE 1 (2014) (estimating that demand response “can directly 
reduce CO2 emissions by more than 1 percent through peak load reductions and provision of 
ancillary services”). 
227. See ELEC. POWER RESEARCH INST., supra note 219, at 9-2 to 9-3 (estimating that demand 
response and other Smart Grid infrastructure may reduce U.S. CO2 emissions by between 18 and 37 
million metric tons by 2030); NAVIGANT CONSULTING, INC., supra note 226, at 1 (estimating that 
demand response “can indirectly reduce CO2 emissions by more than 1 percent through accelerating 
changes in the fuel mix and increasing renewable penetration”).  
228. See DAVITO ET AL., supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
229. See National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Reciprocating Internal 
Combustion Engines, New Source Performance Standards for Stationary Internal Combustion 
Engines, 78 Fed. Reg. 6674 (Jan. 30, 2013) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 63). The 2013 rule’s 
100-hour limit, with the goal of enabling greater use of generators for demand response to promote 
grid reliability, relaxed a 2010 rule that limited backup generators to fifteen hours per year as part of 
a demand response program.  Id. at 6675. The D.C. Circuit recently vacated this portion of the 2013 
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regulations are specific limits on the operation of such generators for 
demand response.
230
 Ultimately, demand response appears to have 
significant potential to reduce air pollutant emissions, if supported by 
environmental policies that channel demand response toward 
environmentally beneficial energy usage. 
FERC’s efforts to expand demand response through wholesale 
markets hit a significant legal snag in 2014. Five energy industry 
associations
231
 petitioned for review of Order 745 in the D.C. Circuit. On 
May 23, 2014, a divided panel of that court vacated Order 745—holding 
that it exceeded FERC’s jurisdiction over wholesale electric power 
markets under the Federal Power Act.
232
 The panel majority held that 
demand response, because it involves end users of electricity who are 
customers in the retail market, is inherently a phenomenon of the retail 
market and therefore outside of FERC’s jurisdiction.233 FERC filed a 
successful petition for certiorari in the Supreme Court, which will hear 
the case in its October 2015 Term.
234
 Even if FERC is unsuccessful in 
reviving Order 745, it still may find ways to preserve or extend other 
demand response initiatives, including assisting states in developing 
robust demand response policies.
235
 
3. Energy Storage 
In recent years, FERC has issued several orders relating to energy 
storage. As with the transmission planning and demand response orders, 
                                                     
rule and remanded it to EPA. See Del. Dep’t of Nat. Res. & Envtl. Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1, 15–
18 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (faulting EPA for failing to respond adequately to concerns raised in public 
comments, relying on faulty evidence, failing to consider limiting the exception to areas not served 
by organized capacity markets, and not obtaining the views of FERC or the North American 
Electric Reliability Corporation); see also infra note 333. 
230. National Emissions Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for Reciprocating Internal 
Combustion Engines, New Source Performance Standards for Stationary Internal Combustion 
Engines, 78 Fed. Reg. at 6679–81. 
231. The five petitioners, aligned with the interests of electric power generators who under Order 
745 faced competition from demand response resources bidding into wholesale electric power 
markets, were the Electric Power Supply Association, American Public Power Association, 
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, Old Dominion Electric Cooperative, and Edison 
Electric Institute. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216 (D.C. Cir. 2014).  
232. See id. at 224.  
233. Id. at 221. 
234. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 753 F.3d 216, cert. granted sub nom, EnerNOC, Inc. v. Elec. 
Power Supply Ass’n, 135 S. Ct. 2049 (May 4, 2015). 
235. See, e.g., Jasmin Melvin, As Legal Challenges Drag on, States Must Take up Demand 
Response Authority, Say Attorneys, INSIDE FERC, July 21, 2014, at 1 (noting that FERC has other 
available mechanisms for promoting demand response). 
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FERC has acted pursuant to its authority under the Federal Power Act to 
ensure rates in wholesale electricity markets are “just and reasonable.”236 
Also as with the transmission planning and demand response orders, 
FERC—while maintaining a regulatory rationale rooted in economic 
regulation—has adopted policies that have very significant 
environmental impacts and environmental justifications. 
Energy storage involves storing previously generated electricity and 
then releasing it at a later time when it is more useful or valuable to the 
grid.
237
 Energy storage technologies include “batteries, flywheels, 
electrochemical capacitors, compressed air storage, thermal storage 
devices and pumped hydroelectric power.”238 Although some forms of 
energy storage—primarily pumped hydroelectric power—have been in 
use for many decades, new technologies have the potential to increase 
energy storage opportunities dramatically.
239
 At the same time, changes 
to the electric power grid, including the integration of distributed 
generation resources that generate variable amounts of power, are 
increasing the value of storage that can release energy at short notice to 
backup reductions in generation.
240
 
In 2011, FERC issued Order 755,
241
 which requires RTOs and ISOs to 
compensate frequency regulation in a manner that takes into account its 
actual value to the grid. Frequency regulation involves a little known, 
                                                     
236. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012) (“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received 
by any public utility for or in connection with the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates 
or charges shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is 
hereby declared to be unlawful.”); id. § 824e(a) (directing FERC, when it has found a public utility 
rate to be “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential,” to “determine the just and 
reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed 
and in force, and shall fix the same by order”); id. § 824o(d)(2) (“The Commission may approve, by 
rule or order, a proposed reliability standard or modification to a reliability standard if it determines 
that the standard is just, reasonable, not unduly discriminatory or preferential, and in the public 
interest.”). 
237. MATTHEW DEAL ET AL., CAL. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, ELECTRIC ENERGY STORAGE: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF POTENTIAL BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES 1, 2 (2010), available at 
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/PUC/energy/reports.htm. See generally Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering 
Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case for Energy Storage, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 697, 705–09 
(2014) (summarizing energy storage technologies). 
238. DEAL ET AL., supra note 237, at 3. 
239. Stein, supra note 237, at 700. 
240. See PAUL DENHOLM ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TECHNICAL REPORT NO. 
NREL/TP-6A2-47187, THE ROLE OF ENERGY STORAGE WITH RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY 
GENERATION 1, 17–18 (2010), available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy10osti/47187.pdf; Matthew 
L. Wald, Energy Storage Plans Gain Ground in California, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2014, at B10. 
241. See Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets, 76 
Fed. Reg. 67,260 (Oct. 31, 2011) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 755]. 
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but essential aspect of managing the electrical grid. The nature of 
electric power is such that electrical grid operators, to maintain 
reliability, must constantly balance supply and demand with very little 
variation in frequency.
242
 This frequency regulation requires quick 
responses, because both system load and generator output constantly 
fluctuate.
243
 The faster a frequency regulation resource can respond 
(ramping ability), and the more accurately it can respond, the more 
valuable the resource to the grid.
244
 Traditionally, grid operators used 
small generators, specially designed to respond to a grid operator’s 
automatic generator control signal, for frequency regulation.
245
 More 
recently, new resources such as demand response and energy storage can 
be used for frequency regulation, often with faster ramping ability.
246
 In 
2011, FERC determined that that RTOs and ISOs were not sufficiently 
accounting for performance in compensating frequency regulation and 
were not paying a uniform market-clearing price.
247
 Order 755 
accordingly requires RTOs and ISOs to compensate frequency 
regulation resources with a uniform price paid to all cleared resources 
plus a performance payment reflecting ramping speed.
248
 
In addition to Order 755, FERC has issued other orders that govern 
the integration of energy storage into the electrical grid. FERC Order 
784
249
 revised FERC’s accounting and reporting requirements to address 
transactions associated with energy storage operations.
250
 FERC Order 
792
251
 revised FERC’s Small Generator Interconnection Procedures and 
Small Generator Interconnection Agreement to include energy 
storage.
252
 Neither Order 784 nor 792 necessarily increases the 
                                                     
242. Id. at 67,261. 
243. See BRENDAN J. KIRBY, OAK RIDGE NAT’L LAB., NO. TM-2004/291, FREQUENCY 
REGULATION BASICS AND TRENDS 3 (2004), available at 
http://ferc.gov/EventCalendar/Files/20100526085937-
Kirby,%20Frequency%20Regulation%20Basics%20and%20Trends.pdf. 
244. Order 755, supra note 241, at 67,261. 
245. See Kirby, supra note 243, at 3. 
246. Order 755, supra note 241, at 67,261. 
247. See id. at 67,260. 
248. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g)(8) (2015). 
249. Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services, Accounting and Financial Reporting for New 
Electric Storage Technologies, 78 Fed. Reg. 46,178 (July 30, 2013) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 
35, 101) [hereinafter Order 784]. 
250. Id. at 46,195–99. 
251. Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,240 (Dec. 5, 
2013) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 792]. 
252. Id. at 73,269. 
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incentives for energy storage, but both Orders attempt to ensure that 
energy storage resources will have access to power markets under terms 
and conditions comparable to those that apply to traditional power 
resources.
253
 
Environmental advocacy organizations commented in support of each 
of FERC’s energy storage-related orders.254 These environmental 
commenters attributed their participation to their objective of promoting 
integration of energy efficiency, demand response, and renewable 
resources into the electricity grid.
255
 
4. Standard Interconnection Agreements 
One of the most important legal drivers of innovation in the electric 
power industry has been FERC’s efforts to develop competitive power 
markets, beginning with Order 888, which is founded on the principle of 
non-discriminatory open access to transmission services.
256
 
“Interconnection is an element of transmission,” FERC concluded.257 
FERC thereafter issued Order 2003, which requires utilities to adopt 
certain standard generator interconnection procedures and an 
agreement.
258
 In issuing Order 2003, FERC explained that a competitive 
transmission market requires “relatively unencumbered entry into the 
market,” that interconnection provides a mechanism for market entry, 
and that creating a standard set of procedures and agreement for 
interconnections would facilitate interconnection.
259
 Order 2003, 
however, applies only to large generators with capacity greater than 
twenty megawatts.
260
 
                                                     
253. See, e.g., Order 784, supra note 249, at 46,199. 
254. See Order 792, supra note 251, at 73,277 (listing Public Interest Organizations, which 
includes numerous environmental groups, and the Union of Concerned Scientists as commenters); 
Order 784, supra note 249, at 46,212 (listing Public Interest Organizations, which includes 
numerous environmental groups, as commenters); Order 755, supra note 241, at 67,285 (listing the 
Environmental Defense Fund and Public Interest Organizations as commenters). 
255. See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund, Comment Letter on Proposed Rulemaking on Frequency 
Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets 1 (May 2, 2011) 
(commenting on Order 755, supra note 241).  
256. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission 
Services by Public Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R pts. 35 
and 385) [hereinafter Order 888]; see also supra notes 160–61 and accompanying text. 
257. Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 67 Fed. Reg. 
22,250, 22,251 (proposed May 2, 2002) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35). 
258. Standardization of Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 68 Fed. Reg. 
49,846 (Aug. 19, 2003) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 2003]. 
259. Id. at 49,848. 
260. Id. at 49,846. Because they apply to large generators, the procedures are known as the Large 
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In 2005, FERC issued Order 2006, which sets forth standard 
interconnection procedures and an agreement for small generators with 
capacity of twenty megawatts or less.
261
 Since issuing Order 2006, 
FERC has followed up with Order 792, which amends the small 
generator procedures to further facilitate interconnection by small 
generators.
262
 In support of Order 792, FERC cited the strong growth in 
small-scale, grid-connected renewable energy generation, driven in part 
by state renewable portfolio standards, which will create a need for more 
interconnections.
263
 Order 792 also clarified that the definition of a small 
generation facility under Order 2006 may include energy storage 
devices.
264
 
B. Environmental Policies that Align with Energy Objectives 
Like FERC, EPA has pursued policies that create energy-environment 
alignments. One of EPA’s policies that aligns with energy objectives 
occurred at Congress’s direction in the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990.
265
 Another more recent policy, the much-anticipated and wildly 
controversial Clean Power Plan, occurred at the agency’s own initiative. 
1. Acid Rain Program’s Conservation and Renewable Energy 
Credits 
In the 1980s, television, newspapers, and scientific journals published 
alarming reports of the problem of acid rain.
266
 Acidic precipitation 
                                                     
Generator Interconnection Procedures (LGIP). Id. at 49,847. FERC initially proposed 
interconnection procedures that would have applied to all generators, but then severed small 
generators into a separate rulemaking after concluding that the procedures for large generators 
would impose unnecessary burdens on small generators. Id. at 49,848–49. 
261. See Order 2006, supra note 7. The procedures are known as the Small Generator 
Interconnection Procedures (SGIP). Id. at 34,190. 
262. Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures, 78 Fed. Reg. 73,240 (Dec. 5, 
2013) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) [hereinafter Order 792]. 
263. Id. at 73,245. 
264. Id. at 73,269. 
265. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549, 104 Stat. 2399. 
266. As EPA has described, 
Acid rain is the accepted term which encompasses a complex set of phenomena that begins 
with fossil fuel emissions, includes the transport and transformation of those emissions through 
the atmosphere, and ends with the effects of those emissions and their resulting transformation 
products on the environment . . . . The presence of these emissions and their transformation 
products in the atmosphere contributes to reduced visibility and is suspected of posing a threat 
to human health at current levels. 
Acid Rain Program: Permits, Allowance System, Continuous Emissions Monitoring, and Excess 
Emissions, 56 Fed. Reg. 63,002, 63,004 (proposed Dec. 3, 1991) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 
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caused by sulfur dioxide emissions from burning fossil fuels was killing 
trees, fish, and aquatic vegetation.
267
 A New York Times opinion piece 
labeled acid rain the Stealthy Destruction from the Sky.
268
 
The 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments created a regulatory program to 
address the problem of acid rain.
269
 The program initiated a cap-and-
trade system that mandated reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions, 
primarily from coal-fired power plants owned by electric utilities, and 
allowed regulated sources to market their unused emission 
allowances.
270
 The program allocated up to 300,000 bonus allowances
271
 
for electric utilities that reduced their sulfur dioxide emissions earlier 
than required by using energy conservation measures or renewable 
energy sources.
272
 
To qualify for these special allowances, electric utilities had to meet 
specified standards.
273
 The program was available only to utilities that 
owned or operated at least one generation unit regulated by the new Acid 
Rain Program.
274
 Electric utility companies had to designate the energy 
conservation measures and renewable energy sources that formed the 
basis for the allowances they sought.
275
 They also had to quantify the 
sulfur dioxide emissions avoided through these measures and sources in 
                                                     
72, 73, 75, 77). 
267. Philip H. Abelson, Acid Rain, 221 SCIENCE 115, 115 (1983); Acid Rain Assailed in New 
Hampshire, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 10, 1983), http://www.nytimes.com/1983/03/10/us/acid-rain-
assailed-in-new-hampshire.html; Ronald Kotulak, ‘Acid Rain’ Means a Dead Lake, ‘Acid Rain’ 
Means Pollution, THE DAY (New London, Conn.), Apr. 4, 1982, at D4; Tapped Out: Vermont’s 
Poor Maple Sap Harvest Linked to Acid Rain, NBC LEARN, 
https://highered.nbclearn.com/portal/site/HigherEd/flatview?cuecard=41184 (last visited Nov. 8, 
2015) (providing transcript of NBC News broadcast from Apr. 18, 1987). 
268. Maureen Ogden, Op-Ed., Stealthy Destruction from the Sky, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1983, at 
NJ34. 
269. Clean Air Act §§ 401–416, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7651–7651o (2012).  
270. See Ann E. Carlson, Iterative Federalism and Climate Change, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 
1144 (2009); Spence, supra note 16, at 190. 
271. Each allowance authorizes a source to emit one ton of sulfur dioxide. Clean Air Act 
§ 402(3), 42 U.S.C. § 7651a(3). 
272. Id. § 404(f), 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(f). In addition to the bonus allowances that reward early 
emissions reductions, utilities can also effectively earn allowances by adopting conservation 
measures that reduce electric power generation; such conservation measures automatically earn 
allowances when the utility reduces generation and therefore emissions. See EPA Pushes ‘Nega-
Allowances’ to Boost DSM as Tool to Cut Acid Rain Emissions, UTIL. ENV’T REP., Nov. 13, 1992, 
at 4. 
273. Clean Air Act § 404(f)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(f)(2)(B). 
274. 42 U.S.C. § 7651c(f)(2)(B)(v). 
275. Id. § 7651c(f)(2)(D)(i)(I). 
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accordance with EPA regulations.
276
 To qualify for the special 
allowances, energy conservation or renewable energy measures had to 
be consistent with a plan for meeting demand “at the lowest system 
cost.”277 The Secretary of Energy had to certify that adopting energy 
conservation measures would not reduce the electric utility’s net 
income.
278
 The state regulatory authority with jurisdiction over the utility 
had to certify the accuracy of the utility’s application for special 
allowances.
279
 
Some of these requirements pertained to the environmental objectives 
of the Acid Rain Program. Limiting the special allowances to utilities 
that were part of the Acid Rain Program, requiring the utilities to 
provide evidence and quantification of reduced energy use, and requiring 
the utilities to obtain a certification from their state regulatory authorities 
all helped to ensure that the special allowances were granted for actual 
emissions reductions. 
But other of these requirements pertained to energy policy, not 
environmental, objectives. The idea of meeting demand “at the lowest 
system cost” incorporates energy law’s objective of keeping energy 
costs low—for example, as reflected in the “just and reasonable” 
standard that pervades energy statutes.
280
 The requirement that energy 
conservation measures may not reduce a utility’s net income derives 
                                                     
276. Id. § 7651c(f)(2)(D)(i)(II). 
277. Id. § 7651c(f)(2)(B)(iii). 
278. Id. § 7651c(f)(2)(B)(iv). 
279. Id. § 7651c(f)(2)(D). 
280. See supra Part I.A. To be more specific, “lowest system cost” is associated with the concept 
of integrated resource planning, which originated in the 1980s. See Lesley K. McAllister, Adaptive 
Mitigation in the Electric Power Sector, 2011 BYU L. REV. 2115, 2151 (2011). Integrated resource 
planning is “a planning and selection process for new energy resources that evaluates the full range 
of alternatives . . . in order to provide adequate and reliable service to its electric customers at the 
lowest system cost.” 16 U.S.C. § 2602(19) (2012). This contrasts with more traditional energy 
approaches, which focused on supply-side alternatives and neglected demand-side measures. See 
McAllister, supra, at 2151. Subsequent to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments, the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992 imposed some integrated resource planning requirements on the energy sector. See 15 
U.S.C. § 3203(b)(3) (2012) (requiring gas utilities to employ integrated resource planning “to 
provide adequate and reliable service to its gas customers at the lowest system cost”); 16 U.S.C. 
§ 831m-1(b)(1) (requiring the Tennessee Valley Authority to “employ and implement a planning 
and selection process for new energy resources which evaluates the full range of existing and 
incremental resources . . . in order to provide adequate and reliable service to electric customers of 
the Tennessee Valley Authority at the lowest system cost”); id. § 2621(d)(7) (requiring electric 
utilities to employ integrated resource planning); 42 U.S.C. § 7275(2) (defining “integrated resource 
planning” as “a planning process for new energy resources that evaluates the full range of 
alternatives . . . in order to provide adequate and reliable service to its electric customers at the 
lowest system cost”); id. § 7276(a) (requiring customers of the Western Area Power Administration 
“to implement . . . integrated resource planning”). 
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from concerns that energy conservation, by reducing electric power 
sales, can undermine utilities’ cost recovery structure.281 
Thus, the Clean Air Act’s Conservation and Renewable Energy 
Credits were as much an energy policy as they were an environmental 
policy.
282
 Indeed, the congressional authors of the program argued to the 
energy sector that their legislation “provides an opportunity” for utilities, 
state public utility commissions, and utility customers—in addition to 
environmental interests—to benefit.283 
2. Clean Power Plan 
EPA’s Clean Power Plan is the centerpiece of the agency’s efforts to 
address climate change.
284
 The problem of anthropogenic climate change 
looms over all other environmental issues, in terms of the scope of the 
harms it threatens and the complexities and difficulties of both the 
problem and potential mitigating responses.
285
 While Congress has failed 
                                                     
281. See Edward J. Markey & Carlos J. Moorhead, The Clean Air Act and Bonus Allowances, 
PUB. UTIL. FORT., May 15, 1991, at 31, 31–32 (noting that “this element is critical to the successful 
pursuit of conservation measures because it addresses the revenue loss and other financial penalties 
traditionally associated with reduced electricity sales”). A similar concern applies to demand 
response, where FERC has acknowledged the possibility that “dispatching demand response 
resources may result in an increased cost per unit ($/MWh) to the remaining wholesale load 
associated with the decreased amount of load paying the bill.” Order 745, supra note 206, at 16,659. 
In Order 745, FERC referred to this as the “billing unit effect.” Id. To address the billing unit effect 
in demand response, FERC Order 745 requires RTOs and ISOs to use a “net benefits test,” which 
“ensure[s] that the overall benefit of the reduced LMP that results from dispatching demand 
response resources exceeds the cost of dispatching and paying LMP to those resources.” Id. FERC’s 
net benefits test thus performs a function similar to the “net income” test in the Clean Air Act Acid 
Rain Program. Id. 
282. See Markey & Moorhead, supra note 281, at 31 (hailing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 
1990 as “the most important and far-reaching energy legislation considered by the president and 
Congress in a decade”). 
283. See id. at 33–34. 
284. Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Aug. 20, 
2015), http://www2.epa.gov/cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants (referring to 
the Clean Power Plan as “a historic and important step in reducing carbon pollution from power 
plants that takes real action on climate change”). 
285. See Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the 
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159–60 (2009) (explaining that climate 
change is a “super wicked problem” because of its “enormous interdependencies, uncertainties, 
circularities, and conflicting stakeholders”; because “the longer it takes to address the problem, the 
harder it will be to do so”; because “those who are in the best position to address the problem . . . 
[have] the least immediate incentive to act”; and because of “the absence of an existing institutional 
framework of government with the ability to develop, implement, and maintain the laws necessary 
to address a problem of climate change’s tremendous spatial and temporal scope”); Kelly Levin et 
al., Playing It Forward: Path Dependency, Progressive Incrementalism, and the “Super Wicked” 
Problem of Global Climate Change 5–8 (June 3, 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
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to take significant action on the issue,
286
 EPA has moved forward with 
addressing climate change under its existing statutory authorities, 
primarily the Clean Air Act.
287
 Because energy-related activities account 
for the vast majority of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions in the 
United States,
288
 they have been the focus of EPA’s climate change 
regulatory initiatives.
289
 
In October 2015, EPA published its Clean Power Plan, which requires 
states to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from existing fossil fuel-fired 
electric generating units by thirty percent by 2030.
290
 EPA promulgated 
the Clean Power Plan under Clean Air Act section 111(d), which directs 
the agency to establish a procedure for states to develop standards of 
performance for certain existing sources of air pollutant emissions.
291
 
Section 111 provides that the standards must limit emissions to the 
extent “achievable through the application of the best system of emission 
reduction.”292 EPA’s Plan identifies three categories of strategies—
which EPA calls “building blocks”—that can comprise a best system of 
emission reduction.
293
 First, states can improve operation and 
maintenance and add equipment upgrades that improve the fuel 
efficiency of existing coal plants.
294
 Second, states can shift generation 
                                                     
Washington Law Review) (originating the term “super wicked” and applying it to the problem of 
climate change). 
286. See generally Carl Hulse & David M. Herszenhorn, Democrats Call Off Effort for Climate 
Bill in Senate, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2010, at A15; Elizabeth Kolbert, Uncomfortable Climate, NEW 
YORKER, Nov. 22, 2010, at 53; Ryan Lizza, As the World Burns, NEW YORKER, Oct. 11, 2010, at 
70.  
287. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 134 S. Ct. 2427, 2436–38 (2014); Climate Change: 
Regulatory Initiatives, U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY (Sept. 15, 2015), 
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/EPAactivities/regulatory-initiatives.html.  
288. See INVENTORY OF U.S. GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS AND SINKS, supra note 1, at 3-1 
(reporting that, in 2012, energy-related activities accounted for 84.3% of anthropogenic greenhouse 
gas emissions in the United States). 
289. In addition to the proposed performance standards for existing power plants, other EPA 
climate change regulation has addressed emissions from vehicles, see, e.g., 2017 and Later Model 
Year Light-Duty Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Corporate Average Fuel Economy 
Standards, 77 Fed. Reg. 62,624 (Oct. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 523, 531, 533, 536, 
537), and proposed performance standards for new power plants, see Standards of Performance for 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions from New Stationary Sources: Electric Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. 
Reg. 1430 (proposed Jan. 8, 2014) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, 70, 71, 98). 
290. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64,662, 64,663 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).  
291. Clean Air Act § 111(d), 42 U.S.C. § 7411(d) (2012). 
292. Id. § 111(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1). 
293. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,667. 
294. Id. at 64,745. The equipment upgrades do not include construction of carbon capture and 
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from coal plants to existing natural gas-fired power plants.
295
 Third, 
states can increase their use of renewable and nuclear power plants.
296
 
States can choose from among these building blocks to meet their state-
specific emissions reduction goals.
297
 
In issuing the Plan, EPA acknowledged that it would have important 
ramifications for the operation of the electric power system, including 
grid reliability.
298
 EPA intends for its Plan to “reinforce” efforts that 
states and utilities are making to modernize their electric power 
systems.
299
 EPA developed its proposal with the intent to give states 
sufficient flexibility to develop carbon reduction plans that also fully 
satisfy their energy policy goals, such as preserving diversity of fuel 
sources, maintaining reliability, and providing affordable electricity.
300
 
In furtherance of this goal, EPA undertook extensive consultation with 
governmental and non-governmental actors from the energy sector, 
including FERC, state energy regulators, and system operators.
301
 
                                                     
storage technology or converting coal plants to natural gas, both of which EPA concluded would 
likely be more expensive than other emissions reduction strategies. Id. at 64,728. 
295. Id. at 64,745–47.  
296. Id. at 64,747–78. EPA’s proposed rule included a fourth building block, improved end-use 
energy efficiency. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 79 Fed. Reg. 34,830, 34,858, 34,871–75 (proposed June 18, 2014) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60). EPA had estimated that states could reduce their electricity use by at 
least 1.5% through energy efficiency measures and had factored emissions reductions through 
increased end-use energy efficiency into each state’s emissions limitations. Id. at 34,872. The final 
Clean Power Plan allows states to use end-use energy efficiency as a means of meeting their 
emissions limitations, but does not use end-use energy efficiency as a factor in determining states’ 
emissions limitations. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: 
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,673–74. 
297. Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric Utility 
Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. at 64,665 (“States will have the flexibility to choose from a range of 
plan approaches and measures, including numerous measures beyond those considered in setting the 
CO2 emission performance rates, and this final rule allows and encourages states to adopt the most 
effective set of solutions for their circumstances, taking account of cost and other considerations.”). 
298. Id. at 64,663, 63,671. 
299. Id. at 64,678. 
300. Id. at 64,679. 
301. Id. at 64,704–07 (describing EPA meetings with stakeholders). Some difference of opinion 
exists as to whether EPA’s Plan contains sufficient flexibility in its requirements that it can avoid 
negatively affecting grid reliability. Compare id. at 64,679 (predicting that Plan will “maintain[] the 
reliability . . . of electricity in the U.S.”), with Bobby McMahon, FERC, DOE to Coordinate with 
EPA on Reliability as Commissioners Speak Out on CPP, INSIDE FERC, Aug. 10, 2015, at 1 (noting 
concerns, including some from FERC commissioners, that the Clean Power Plans will negatively 
affect reliability). 
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C. Bridging the Energy-Environment Divide 
The policies described in this Part
302
 represent a distinctive type of 
energy-environment policy interaction. A policy alignment involves 
policies in one field that align with, without directly adopting, the 
objectives of another field—for example, energy policies that align with 
environmental objectives, and environmental policies that align with 
energy objectives. Policy alignments avoid much of the dysfunctionality 
of the energy-environment divide that is perpetuated and exacerbated by 
the more typical energy and environmental policies described earlier in 
this Article.
303
 
1. Key Characteristics 
Energy-environment policy alignments have certain key 
characteristics that define them as a category and help to distinguish 
them from other approaches to managing energy-environment 
interrelationships. Policy alignments simultaneously support the policy 
objectives of multiple interacting legal fields—here, energy law and 
environmental law. Energy-environment policy alignments occur when 
energy policies, while still promoting energy objectives, align with 
environmental objectives or when environmental policies, while still 
promoting environmental objectives, align with energy objectives. 
Policy alignments thus reflect several important insights regarding 
energy-environment interactions: energy and environmental goals are 
not necessarily in conflict; energy and environmental goals indeed may 
be complementary; and energy and environmental policies can aim to 
leverage complementarity rather than just to manage conflict. 
Aligned policies support the objectives of other fields while 
maintaining their focus on the objectives of their own field. The energy 
policies discussed in Part III.A derive their authority and objectives from 
the Federal Power Act. Although the effect of these energy policies is to 
encourage conditions that yield environmental benefits, they retain their 
focus on economic regulation to promote efficient energy markets. The 
environmental policies discussed in Part III.B derive their authority and 
objectives from the Clean Air Act.
304
 Although the effect of these 
                                                     
302. See supra Part III.A−B. 
303. See supra Parts III. 
304. The Acid Rain Program discussed supra in Part III.B.1 did involve a legislative amendment 
to the Clean Air Act as part of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. But the Acid Rain 
Program—although innovative in its use of market-based regulatory mechanisms, see Jonathan B. 
Wiener, Something Borrowed for Something Blue: Legal Transplants and the Evolution of Global 
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environmental policies is to encourage conditions that maintain or 
improve the efficiency of energy markets, they retain their overall 
primary focus on limiting air pollutant emissions. 
Policy alignments thus enable FERC to generate environmental 
benefits without adopting environmental objectives, and EPA to promote 
the efficiency of energy markets without adopting energy objectives. In 
both cases, a modest but significant reframing of the regulatory 
framework within each field allows the development of complementary 
policies that create synergistic policy alignments with other fields. 
Policy alignments do not require either FERC or EPA to depart from its 
established policy objectives or statutory authorities. 
That being said, although policy alignments firmly reside within their 
respective fields, they also challenge traditional legal categories. FERC’s 
Order 1000,
305
 for example, is in many respects a typical energy 
regulation. It was issued by FERC, an energy regulator; is directed at 
RTOs and ISOs, paragons of the energy sector; under the auspices of the 
Federal Power Act, a canonical energy statute.
306
 But by other measures 
Order 1000 is significantly environmental: Its environmental effects may 
exceed those of many environmental policies and environmental 
organizations actively participated in FERC’s rulemaking process.307 
Similar observations can be made about EPA’s proposed Clean Power 
Plan. It is being developed by EPA, an environmental regulator; is 
directed at power plants, classic targets of environmental regulation; 
under the authority of the Clean Air Act, a canonical environmental 
statute.
308
 But the effects of the Clean Power Plan on the energy sector 
are such that it may be one of the most important energy policies in 
recent history. 
Although policy alignments involve overlapping regulatory areas, 
they differ substantially from the type of intensive interagency effort 
required in, for example, a joint rulemaking.
309
 Policy alignments allow 
each agency to stay within its traditional statutory framework; the 
                                                     
Environmental Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1295, 1315 (2001)—is very much exemplary of the 
emissions limitation-based approach to environmental regulation that pervades environmental law. 
Thus, the Acid Rain Program retained the Clean Air Act’s overall structure and objectives. 
305. Order 1000, supra note 174. 
306. See supra Part III.A.1. 
307. See supra notes 194–97 and accompanying text. 
308. See supra Part III.B.2. 
309. See, e.g., Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards and Fuel Efficiency Standards for Medium- 
and Heavy-Duty Engines and Vehicles, 76 Fed. Reg. 57,106 (Sept. 15, 2011) (to be codified at 40 
C.F.R. pts. 85, 86, 600, 1033, 1036, 1037, 1039, 1065, 1066, 1068) (joint rule of EPA and 
Department of Transportation). 
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interdependence of the agencies’ policies does not create formally 
shared regulatory space.
310
 This phenomenon obviates some of the need 
for formal coordination mechanisms.
311
 Policy alignments can instead 
rely on informal coordination mechanisms, which can be as simple as 
considering another agency’s regulatory activities, without detailed 
direct communication.
312
 In this way, policy alignments can create law 
that takes advantages of potential synergies across legal fields without 
creating complex and potentially burdensome new regulatory bodies or 
legal regimes. 
When more active coordination or interagency supervision is needed, 
it is available as an option to agencies. Active coordination has 
advantages—it may allow agencies, for example, to leverage their 
respective expertise.
313
 By not requiring active coordination, however, 
policy alignments allow agencies to tailor the extent of their 
coordination to the specific circumstances of their interdependence. 
Most of the policy alignments discussed in this Article, for example, 
appear not to have involved active collaboration between FERC and 
EPA, and there is no indication that the policies were weaker as a result. 
Concerns about the reliability impacts of the Clean Power Plan, 
however, appear to be leading to more active coordination between 
FERC and EPA.
314
 
                                                     
310. See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 
HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1134 (2012) (discussing the “shared regulatory space” created by “fragmented 
and overlapping delegations of power to administrative agencies”). 
311. Cf. id. at 1145–51 (discussing “four types of multiple-agency delegations”: “overlapping 
agency functions,” “related jurisdictional assignments,” “interacting jurisdictional assignments,” 
and “delegations requiring concurrence”). 
312. See Todd S. Aagaard, Regulatory Overlap, Overlapping Legal Fields, and Statutory 
Discontinuities, 29 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 237, 290 (2011); cf. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 310, at 1156 
(“Informal coordination regularly occurs without any explicit communication between agencies, as 
where one agency observes what another agency is doing or anticipates another agency’s decisions 
and adjusts its decisions accordingly to avoid tension or friction.”). 
313. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 310, at 1184; Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” 
Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1135 (2010) (noting benefits of 
presidential supervision, including coordinating agencies). 
314. See, e.g., Letter from Norman C. Bay, Chairman, FERC et al., to Janet G. McCabe, Acting 
Assistant Adm’r, Office of Air & Radiation, EPA (May 15, 2015), available at 
https://www.ferc.gov/media/headlines/2015/ferc-letter-epa.pdf (noting that FERC held a series of 
technical conferences regarding the implications of the Clean Power Plan for grid reliability and 
addressing issues raised at the conferences); Keith Goldberg, EPA Leaning on FERC to Blunt Clean 
Power Plan Grid Effect, LAW360 (Apr. 28, 2015, 3:50 PM), http://www.law360.com/ 
articles/648711/epa-leaning-on-ferc-to-blunt-clean-power-plan-grid-effect (noting statements from 
EPA Administrator Gina McCarthy that EPA worked closely with FERC to address concerns about 
the effects of the Clean Power Plan on grid reliability). The apparent ability and willingness of EPA 
and FERC to modulate their extent of collaboration based on the circumstances—for example, 
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2. Advantages 
Energy-environment policy alignments provide an alternative to 
requirements as a means of managing interactions between energy law 
and environmental law. Although requirements have their benefits, and 
even may be necessary in some situations, in many circumstances policy 
alignments exhibit strong advantages over requirements. 
Both policy alignments and requirements are means of managing 
interactions across legal fields and across agency jurisdictions. 
Requirements manage those interactions by imposing negative 
constraints—that is, by placing limits on one field to prevent it from 
interfering with another field. Thus, for example, the Clean Air Act’s 
conformity requirement prevents FERC’s energy programs—as well as 
other agencies’ programs—from causing certain deteriorations in air 
quality.
315
 In doing so, however, the conformity requirement may 
prevent projects that would advance FERC’s goal of ensuring affordable 
and ample energy supplies. RCRA’s hydraulic fracturing exclusion 
similarly prevents EPA’s hazardous waste regulations from interfering 
with the production of oil and natural gas.
316
 In doing so, however, the 
exclusion may prevent EPA from taking action against oil and gas 
practices that threaten human or environmental health. 
Policy alignments, by contrast, manage interactions between fields by 
leveraging opportunities for policies that can simultaneously promote the 
objectives of both fields, thereby creating interagency synergies. Thus, 
FERC’s demand response orders utilize a traditional mechanism of 
energy regulation—rate regulation—to regulate the price paid for 
demand response services.
317
 In doing so, FERC incentivizes reductions 
in electricity usage that advance an energy policy objective—increasing 
the economic efficiency and competitiveness of wholesale electric power 
markets—and also potentially promote the environmental goal of 
reducing emissions from electric power generation. EPA’s Clean Power 
Plan will similarly incentivize reductions in unnecessary electricity 
generation, advancing the agency’s environmental goals while also 
                                                     
collaborating more actively with respect to the Clean Power Plan than for transmission planning—
may alleviate concerns that agencies will take advantage of informal coordination to avoid more 
costly active collaboration mechanisms, such as joint rulemaking, even when more active 
collaboration would be worthwhile. 
315. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (discussing Clean Air Act § 176, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7506 (2012)). 
316. See supra notes 128–29 (discussing RCRA § 3001(b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 6921(b)(2)). 
317. See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing FERC Orders 719 and 745). 
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promoting more efficient energy markets.
318
 The Power Plan, moreover, 
utilizes a traditional environmental policy mechanism—limiting 
pollutant emissions—to accomplish its objective.319 
The energy-environment policy alignments described above
320
 are 
taking advantage of opportunities created by dramatic changes in the 
energy sector focused in electricity markets. For example, energy 
technologies such as renewable energy generation, demand response, 
and energy storage are creating opportunities for energy options that are 
more economically efficient and less environmentally harmful. The 
existence of these opportunities creates a space for potential energy-
environment policy synergies that FERC and EPA can promote through 
policy alignments. 
The frequent and active participation of environmental organizations 
in FERC rulemaking proceedings
321
 suggests that the potential 
environmental benefits of FERC policies are perceived as real and 
significant. The mixed reaction of FERC and state energy regulators to 
EPA’s Clean Power Plan, by contrast, may suggest that its potential 
energy benefits are less clear or more contingent. Alternatively, critiques 
of the Clean Power Plan coming from some corners of the energy sector 
may merely indicate that the Plan threatens to disrupt the energy sector, 
which may in fact enhance efficiency and competition. 
Policy alignments, when feasible, provide a model for managing 
energy-environment interactions that is generally superior to the 
negative constraints model exemplified by energy requirements and 
environmental requirements. The negative constraints model applies 
only in the event of a conflict between energy objectives and 
environmental objectives and attempts to manage that conflict by 
imposing limits on each respective field. Policy alignments, by contrast, 
attempt to direct energy and environmental policies in mutually 
compatible and even complementary directions—for example, by 
creating incentives for energy markets to develop in ways that both 
                                                     
318. See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing EPA’s proposed Clean Power Plan). 
319. A skeptic might dispute the distinction between negative constraints and synergies, and 
argue that the policy alignments outlined in Part III.A–B also operate as negative constraints—for 
example, that Acid Rain Program’s Conservation and Renewable Energy Credits impose limits on 
electric power. This may be true of emissions limitations generally; emissions limitations constrain 
the generation of electric power for the sake of environmental benefits. Conservation and renewable 
energy credits, by contrast, take advantage of ways of generating power that promote both energy 
objectives and environmental objectives.  
320. See supra Part III.A–B. 
321. See supra notes 194–97, 215–16, 254–55 and accompanying text. 
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increase economic efficiency and reduce pollutant emissions.
322
 
3. Limitations 
Despite their advantage over negative constraints, policy alignments 
are not superior in every respect. Alignments have limitations that 
should be considered in designing policies to manage energy-
environment interactions. 
First, policy alignments only work when interacting objectives can be 
reconciled. To the extent objectives pose unavoidable conflicts, 
requirements may be necessary, as a backstop to alignments, to manage 
those conflicts. Indeed, even the policy alignments described above use 
requirements to a limited extent. Because demand response can lead to 
diesel-powered on-site generation with high pollutant emissions, EPA 
regulations limit the use of diesel generators for demand response.
323
 
The Acid Rain program’s energy conservation credits also contain 
requirements that limit the use of energy conservation to ensure that 
energy conservation programs do not unduly increase electricity rates or 
undermine a utility’s cost recovery structure.324 Concern about the 
reliability impacts of the Clean Power Plan
325
 may indicate that some 
energy requirements will be appropriate there as well. 
The fact that requirements may sometimes be necessary, however, 
does not undermine the contributions that policy alignments can make. 
In fact, requirements and alignments can work together as part of an 
overall strategy, with alignments leveraging synergies where they can be 
created, and requirements managing conflicts where they unavoidably 
occur. This is much better than relying merely on requirements, which 
have effect only by imposing negative constraints. 
Second, policy alignments also can call into question the legitimacy 
of an agency action because they raise the prospect that an agency’s 
                                                     
322. The examples of energy-environment policy alignments offered here are not necessarily 
ideal or optimal policies. FERC Order 745 has been accused of overcompensating demand response. 
See Pierce, supra note 201, at 108. Order 1000 has been criticized for not requiring cost allocation 
for non-transmission alternatives. See Welton & Gerrard, supra note 186, at 11. EPA’s Clean Power 
Plan has been maligned for allegedly threatening grid reliability. See McMahon, supra note 301. 
Whether or not any of these specific criticisms are accurate, the policies inevitably will fall short of 
their ambitious objectives in some respect. But no policies are perfect, and none of these criticisms 
calls into question the general approach of policy alignments as a model for managing the energy-
environment relationship. Similar shortcomings may pervade policies that follow the negative 
constraints model. 
323. See supra notes 229–30 and accompanying text. 
324. See supra notes 280–81 and accompanying text. 
325. See supra note 301. 
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motives may diverge from its stated objectives. For example, despite 
FERC’s stated justification for Order 1000, which relied exclusively on 
Federal Power Act section 206’s authority to set just and reasonable 
rates for electricity transmission services,
326
 some may suspect that 
FERC’s reliance on section 206 was pretextual, and that the agency 
issued Order 1000 to promote renewable energy development for 
environmental reasons, which would be contrary to the agency’s 
proffered rationale for the rule and arguably contrary to FERC’s own 
interpretations of its statutory authority under the Federal Power Act.
327
 
Remarks by commentators praising Order 1000 for its environmental 
benefits
328
 may stoke such concerns. A lack of transparency and 
departure from statutory authority are among the graver sins an agency 
can commit.
329
 Transparency begets accountability, which in turn begets 
legitimacy.
330
 Thus, the legitimacy of an agency’s action may be called 
into question if its policy alignments implicate objectives that the agency 
does not acknowledge and that are outside of the agency’s mandate.331 
However, rationality—another core dictate for agencies332—requires 
taking into account interactions among regulatory programs. The mere 
fact that FERC’s actions in furtherance of the Federal Power Act’s 
energy policy objectives may also create additional, environmental 
benefits not endorsed by FERC’s statutes but complementary to EPA’s 
regulatory programs should not impugn the legitimacy of FERC’s 
                                                     
326. See, e.g., Order 1000, supra note 174, at 49,844. 
327. See supra note 118. 
328. See, e.g., James & Allen, supra note 175 (opining that Order 1000 represents a “huge step” 
toward clean energy). 
329. See, e.g., Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n, Inc. v. Fed. Motor Carrier Safety Admin., 
494 F.3d 188, 202 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (vacating agency rule because the agency failed to disclose 
supporting documents it relied upon to develop the rule); Michigan v. EPA, 268 F.3d 1075, 1081 
(D.C. Cir. 2001) (noting that a federal agency is “a creature of statute” which has “only those 
authorities conferred upon it by Congress”).  
330. See Louis J. Virelli III, Science, Politics, and Administrative Legitimacy, 78 MO. L. REV. 
511, 517 (2013). 
331. In this respect, Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), stands as a warning for agencies 
whose motivations diverge from their statutory mandate. In that case, EPA had denied a rulemaking 
petition for policy reasons that differed from the standard set forth in the Clean Air Act. Id. at 533–
34. The Supreme Court set aside EPA’s decision, holding that the agency must “exercise discretion 
within defined statutory limits.” Id. at 533. The question of the validity of EPA’s action would have 
become somewhat more complicated, however, had EPA cited reasons tied to the Clean Air Act 
standard, while acting with other, unacknowledged motivations. 
332. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Food & Commercial Workers, 484 U.S. 112, 123 (1987) (noting 
that an agency’s statutory construction must be “rational and consistent with the statute”); Motor 
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 463 U.S. 29, 42 (1983) (holding that a court 
reviewing agency action should inquire, among other things, whether action was rational).  
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actions. Indeed, taking into account the interaction of overlapping and 
related regulatory programs allows them to work as a coherent whole. 
As long as an agency, by considering these impacts, does not contradict 
congressional directives, it should be valid.
333
 
Third, policy alignments introduce greater complexity in policy 
design. Agencies face numerous challenges in achieving the ambitious 
policy goals with which they are charged: statutes that grant only limited 
statutory authority, budgets that restrict resources, and often hostile 
members of Congress and outside interest groups that exert political 
pressure. These challenges make it difficult enough for agencies to 
accomplish their own objectives; asking agencies to consider other 
agencies’ goals may seem like an absurd overreach. 
The answer to this concern is that policy alignments may complicate 
policy design, but they should often generate offsetting benefits that 
justify the complication.
334
 Although asking agencies to consider an 
expanded and diversified range of objectives in some senses increases 
the complexity of their mission, it also aligns the programs with the 
reality of the context in which they operate. Agencies that operate in 
policy silos, unaware of how their policies interact with other agencies’ 
policies, cannot expect their policies to be effective. Other agencies’ 
objectives are an essential part of the policy context in which agencies 
                                                     
333. That being said, agencies must proceed cautiously in pursuing a policy objective that falls 
primarily within another agency’s mission. The recent case of Delaware Department of Natural 
Resources & Environmental Control v. EPA, 785 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2015), provides a cautionary tale 
with regard to agency coordination, or lack thereof, in such situations. The case involved a 
challenge to an EPA rule under the Clean Air Act regulating emissions from backup diesel 
generators. Id. at 4. The rule allowed backup generators to operate for up to 100 hours per year for 
emergency demand response to promote grid reliability. Id. at 6. Yet EPA had dismissed comments 
questioning the rule’s relationship to grid reliability, noting that such concerns were primarily 
within FERC’s authority. Id. at 18. In vacating that portion of the rule, the D.C. Circuit faulted EPA 
for attempting to “have it both ways” by “simultaneously rely[ing] on reliability concerns and then 
brush[ing] off comments about those concerns as beyond its purview.” Id. The court “encourage[d]” 
EPA, on remand, to consult with FERC about the rule’s relationship to grid reliability. Id. Read 
narrowly, Delaware merely stands for the rather obvious proposition that an agency should not 
attempt to disavow responsibility for a policy objective it also cites as the basis for its rule. More 
broadly, however, the case indicates that courts may be inclined to less deference when an agency 
regulates to promote a policy objective that lies primarily within another agency’s expertise and 
authority, especially when the agency taking the action has not consulted with the other, expert 
agency. 
334. The benefits of policy alignments to manage interactions across policy objectives likely 
depends on the intensity of the interactions. In this regard, the energy-environment seems 
particularly fruitful territory for using policy alignments. Energy and the environment have always 
interrelated, but they are becoming increasingly interdependent. See supra notes 1–10 and 
accompanying text. The development of a smart grid on the energy side and climate change 
mitigation policies on the environmental side are creating more opportunities for policy alignments 
that will allow energy and environmental policies to work in concert rather than at cross-purposes. 
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operate, and so the effective implementation of agency policy demands 
policy design that takes into consideration other agencies’ objectives. 
Indeed, urging agencies to consider other agencies’ objectives 
counteracts the tunnel vision that can afflict agencies and lead them to 
pursue their otherwise legitimate objectives in ways that put them at 
cross-purposes with broader policy goals
335—the classic problem of 
energy law, with its sometimes excessive devotion to reducing energy 
prices. Asking agencies to consider other policy objectives beyond their 
core mission internalizes tensions among policies; when agencies 
maintain their blinders, the effects of policy interactions are externalized 
to the regulated community and beneficiaries. 
In addition, agencies already face mandates to consider other 
agencies’ policy objectives, in the form of requirements such as those 
described in Part II. The question frequently is not, therefore, whether to 
require agencies to consider other policy goals, but rather how agencies 
should consider other policy goals. And in this respect, it is not clear that 
policy alignments are any more difficult or complex than requirements 
for agencies to consider. 
4. Implications 
Highlighting the contributions that policy alignments can make to 
develop more coherent energy-environment policies has several 
implications for scholars, advocates, analysts, and policymakers 
interested in improving energy and environmental policy. 
First, in thinking about ways to manage energy-environment 
interactions, we should look for opportunities to create policy 
alignments. The examples described above,
336
 which focus on federal 
energy and environmental regulation of the electric power industry, 
suggest that energy-environment policy alignments can be both feasible 
and effective. It remains to be seen whether such opportunities can be 
replicated in other energy markets. 
Perhaps the most promising area for extending energy-environment 
policy alignments is the natural gas industry. Domestic production of 
natural gas has boomed in recent years.
337
 Natural gas also generates 
                                                     
335. Cf. Samuel J. Rascoff & Richard L. Revesz, The Biases of Risk Tradeoff Analysis: Towards 
Parity in Environmental and Health-and-Safety Regulation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1763, 1767 (2002) 
(“‘Tunnel vision’ within agencies prevents them from considering ancillary effects . . . .”). 
336. See supra Part III.A–B. 
337. See John M. Golden & Hannah J. Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a Case 
Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 964–66 (2015). 
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fewer pollutant emissions than other fossil fuels.
338
 As a result, 
somewhat similar to electricity, natural gas provides the policy context 
of an industry that is rapidly changing, potentially in ways with 
significant environmental benefits. 
Can FERC align its natural gas regulation with EPA’s environmental 
regulation to create policy synergies? One of the difficulties of pursuing 
policy synergies with natural gas is that it occupies a heavily contested 
position in environmental policy.
339
 On the one hand, natural gas burns 
significantly cleaner than coal or oil.
340
 On the other hand, natural gas 
still generates emissions, unlike non-fossil-fuel energy sources.
341
 
Energy-environment policy alignments in natural gas might also be 
fruitful at the federal and state levels. One possible example would be 
stricter state oil and gas conservation laws that would limit flaring or 
venting natural gas, which would have the effects of avoiding waste—a 
traditional objective of energy law—and reducing emissions.342 
Second, analyses of the energy-environment divide and arguments in 
favor of greener energy policies should take into account the subtle, 
implicit, and indirect ways in which energy law and environmental law 
already are interacting through policy alignments. These ongoing 
alignments may somewhat undercut normative arguments for more 
dramatic steps to integrate energy and environmental law. If, for 
example, FERC Order 1000 can create something of a system of 
interstate coordination of transmission needs arising from 
environmentally inspired state-level Public Policy Requirements such as 
                                                     
338. See id. at 967–68. 
339. See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas: A Long Bridge to a Promising Destination, 32 
UTAH ENVTL. L. REV. 245 (2012) (arguing that the natural gas boom “will not take the U.S. 
everywhere we would like to go, [but] it is likely to take the U.S. to a destination that is a major 
improvement over the status quo, measured with reference to any plausible set of national or 
international goals”); Why Move Beyond Natural Gas?, SIERRA CLUB, 
http://content.sierraclub.org/naturalgas/why-move-beyond-natural-gas (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) 
(“Fracking for natural gas damages the land, pollutes water and air, and causes illness in 
surrounding communities. It is also a major threat to our climate. It is clear that we cannot transition 
from one fossil fuel to another and expect to see major climate benefits.”). 
340. See Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy Choices, 73 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 341, 405 (2002) (noting that “natural gas is a cleaner fossil fuel than coal or oil”); 
Hannah Wiseman, Expanding Regional Renewable Governance, 35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 477, 
490 (2011) (“Natural gas, in contrast to coal and oil, is a cleaner fossil fuel because it emits fewer 
air pollutants (including greenhouse gases) when burned.”). 
341. See Amy L. Stein, Renewable Energy Through Agency Action, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 651, 
662–63 (2013). 
342. See generally Alexandra B. Klass & Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. 
Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA L. REV. 947, 1014 (2015) (reviewing the problem of natural 
gas flaring, and potential solutions, from oil wells in North Dakota). 
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renewable portfolio standards, this may in turn somewhat reduce the 
comparative advantages of federal-level Public Policy Requirements.
343
 
Third, at the very least, we should recognize that existing energy-
environment policy alignments redefine the normative and descriptive 
baseline from which arguments for integrating energy law and 
environmental law should build. For example, arguments for creating 
national renewable portfolio standards
344
 should take into account the 
interstate coordination already underway pursuant to Order 1000, so as 
to take advantage and account of those efforts and not to undermine 
them. 
Beyond questions of policy design, energy-environment policy 
alignments—and in particular the development of energy policies that 
align with environmental objectives without adopting those objectives—
should prompt us to broaden our understanding of what constitutes 
environmental law. In previous work I have argued in favor of defining 
environmental law as “laws that reflect a consideration of human 
impacts on the natural environment.”345 I also have argued, however, in 
favor of giving greater attention to indirect environmental laws that, 
although not adopted for environmental purposes, have important 
environmental effects.
346
 FERC policies that are part of energy-
environment policy alignments exemplify indirect environmental laws. 
Using indirect environmental laws to pursue environmental objectives 
through energy-environment policy alignments generates advantages 
over relying solely on environmental statutes to address environmental 
problems.
347
 As the energy-environment policy alignments illustrate, 
indirect environmental laws can work synergistically with environmental 
statutes.
348
 Indirect environmental law diversifies and expands the field 
of environmental law, bringing a broader set of policy tools to bear on 
environmental problems.
349
 The policy mechanisms of FERC’s 
economic regulation—for example, rate setting—differ markedly from 
EPA’s regulatory mechanisms under its pollution statutes, which 
                                                     
343. See, e.g., Davies, supra note 151 (arguing for advantages of federal renewable portfolio 
standards). 
344. See, e.g., id. at 1366–75. 
345. Todd S. Aagaard, Environmental Law as a Legal Field: An Inquiry in Legal Taxonomy, 95 
CORNELL L. REV. 221, 263 (2010). 
346. Id. at 263–64 n.181. See generally Todd S. Aagaard, Using Non-Environmental Law to 
Accomplish Environmental Objectives, 30 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 35 (2014) [hereinafter 
Aagaard, Using Non-Environmental Law]. 
347. Aagaard, Using Non-Environmental Law, supra note 346, at 55–59. 
348. See id. at 55–56. 
349. See id. at 56. 
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primarily involve imposing limits on emissions. Indirect environmental 
law also benefits from its non-environmental connections.
350
 FERC 
policies that facilitate the development of renewable energy may reduce 
pollutant emissions in ways not achievable by emissions limits alone. 
Finally, indirect environmental laws involve different political dynamics 
than environmental laws, which in some circumstances may be more 
constructive than environmental law.
351
 
CONCLUSION 
Given the extensive overlap between energy and environmental 
issues, energy regulators and environmental regulators must find some 
way to manage energy-environment interactions. These 
interrelationships are tricky to manage, because energy law and 
environmental law reflect divergent orientations that create tensions. The 
traditional approach has attempted to manage energy-environment 
interrelationships by imposing requirements—forms of negative 
constraints—on each regulator. FERC’s energy policies must comply 
with requirements set forth in environmental statutes, and EPA’s 
environmental statutes contain energy-related requirements and 
exemptions. But this approach exacerbates, rather than alleviates, 
tensions between the divergent orientations of energy and environmental 
law. 
Policy alignments provide an innovative and attractive model for a 
different approach to managing energy-environment relationships. 
Policy alignments occur when policies within one field, while still 
promoting the objectives of that field, align with the objectives of 
another field as well. A string of recent FERC orders and EPA’s 
proposed Clean Power Plan exemplify the ability of policy alignments 
that effectuate both energy and environmental goals. The results are 
energy and environmental policies that focus on creating energy-
environment synergies, rather than merely trying to avoid conflicts. 
The policy alignment model has potential application beyond federal 
energy and environmental law. Within energy and environmental law, 
policy alignments may productively manage other areas of jurisdictional 
overlap, such as the relationship between EPA and the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration in regulating occupational health 
risks.
352
 The policy alignment model also may provide an effective 
                                                     
350. See id. at 56–57. 
351. See id. at 57–59. 
352. See Aagaard, supra note 312 (describing EPA and OSHA policies within their area of 
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mechanism for managing federal-state regulatory relationships within 
energy and environmental law—for example, in the way that FERC’s 
Order 1000 builds state public policy requirements into federal 
transmission planning.
353
 
The policy alignment model also may apply beyond the energy-
environment overlap as well. Many other legal fields—for example, 
antitrust and securities regulation,
354
 environmental law and 
bankruptcy,
355
 and criminal law and immigration law
356—intersect, 
sometimes creating tensions. Where there is tension or conflict, a 
frequent approach is to arrange the competing paradigms in a 
hierarchy—securities law trumps antitrust law,357 or bankruptcy trumps 
environmental law.
358
 Such an approach is akin to the negative 
constraints model reviewed and criticized in this Article.
359
 Although 
conflicts may sometimes be unavoidable, and where they cannot be 
avoided must be managed, a model of addressing inter-field 
relationships that relies primarily or exclusively on negative constraints 
sells short the possibilities for, and benefits of, reconciling overlapping 
legal regimes. Hopefully FERC and EPA will continue to develop 
energy-environment policy alignments, and thereby provide examples 
for constructively managing energy-environment relationships—and 
other intersecting fields as well. 
 
                                                     
jurisdictional overlap that resemble policy alignments). 
353. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
354. See, e.g., Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) LLC v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007). 
355. See, e.g., In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir. 1993). 
356. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010). 
357. See Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 285 (holding that federal securities laws implicitly preclude 
the application of antitrust laws to the alleged conduct of firms that market and distribute newly 
issued securities). 
358. See Jensen, 995 F.2d at 931 (holding that state’s claim for hazardous waste cleanup costs 
was discharged in bankruptcy because state had pre-petition knowledge of debtors’ potential 
liability). 
359. See supra Part II. 
